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Government Lawyers in the  
Trump Administration 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL* 
The words and actions of candidate, President-Elect, and now President Donald 
Trump indicate that this administration will aggressively seek to use state power with 
little regard for the rule of law. A great deal has been written about the constitutional 
and administrative law regulating inter and intra branch separation of powers. 
However, there is no comprehensive legal and theoretical analysis of government 
lawyers as lawyers.  
 
This Article engages with numerous contested issues in the law of lawyering, the 
history of unethical behavior by government attorneys, and jurisprudence to provide 
a constructive legal and ethical conception of government legal advisors. In practical 
terms, it may serve as a source of guidance for lawyers in the new administration, or 
as a roadmap for discipline by lawyer regulators. More theoretically, it defends a 
conception of the rule of law as a practice of reason-giving, not dependent upon legal 
objectivity or determinacy. The Executive Order banning travel to the United States 
from several Muslim-majority countries, and the subsequent firing of Acting Attorney 
General Sally Yates, are case studies illustrating the ethical analysis in this Article. 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Zach Clopton, David Drisen, Bruce Green, Becky 
Roiphe, Dana Remus, and Paul Tremblay for comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The Author gratefully 
acknowledges the research funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal 
Research, Established by the William C. and Joyce C. O’Neil Charitable Trust. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Lawyers in President Donald Trump’s administration have already 
faced, and will continue to face, unprecedented pressure to approve 
unlawful policies and actions. What should an ethical lawyer do under 
these circumstances? The President is entitled to have his policy 
positions respected and implemented by Executive Branch actors. 
Lawyers who advise the Executive Branch are obligated, by generally 
applicable agency law, rules of professional conduct, and longstanding 
traditions of professional ethics, to seek to further the client’s lawful 
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objectives.1 While any official “elected or appointed to an office of honor 
or profit in the civil service” must take an oath to support and defend the 
Constitution,2 lawyers have additional obligations. A lawyer may not 
“counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent.”3 Depending on the nature of the client’s 
proposed course of conduct and the lawyer’s state of mind with respect 
to it, a lawyer may have at least the right, and possibly also the duty, to 
refuse to provide assistance. Lawyers also have duties of competence,4 
communication,5 and independence.6 These professional norms add up 
to an institutional embodiment of the political ideal of the rule of law, 
and a vision of professionalism that locates the ethical value of the legal 
profession in sustaining a common social framework of rights and duties 
that contributes to the stability and the protection of the equality and 
dignity of citizens.7 
However, we are all legal realists now.8 Law is, to a considerable 
extent, an autonomous discursive practice that involves giving reasons of 
a particular type. These reasons emphasize considerations such as 
generality, consistency, integrity, publicity, stability, and systematicity.9 
 
 1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 2. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012). Executive branch constitutionalism is now a well-recognized feature 
of our system of checks and balances. See, e.g., Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the 
Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 687 (2005); Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional 
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?,  
67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 117 (2004); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245 (2001) (arguing that the increasing practice by presidents of using the executive branch agencies 
as extensions of their policies and political agendas comport with the law because Congress should be 
understood to have left authority to the President to direct his executive branch officials); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541,  
566 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that the current presidential power over every party involved in executing laws 
is a large departure from the Framers’ original vision of the executive branch’s role). 
 3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). State courts adopt rules of 
professional conduct pursuant to their inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. See LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS: REGULATION OF LAWYERS–IN GEN. § 1 cmt. c; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2 (1986). To avoid the tedious repetition of “Model Rules” in main text, I will refer 
to them as Rule xx, unless it is necessary to distinguish Model Rules from state versions. 
 4. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1; LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1). 
 5. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4; LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20. 
 6. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1. 
 7. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010). 
 8. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988) (reviewing LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 (1986)). The relationship between legal realism and the 
ethical duties of lawyers has long been recognized. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Positivism 
and the Good Lawyer: A Commentary on W. Bradley Wendel’s Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, 24 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1165 (2011); Tim Dare, Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal and the Ethical Obligations of 
Lawyers, 7 LEGAL ETHICS 24 (2004); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
468 (1990); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1987). 
 9. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 44 (2008); see also Scott 
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The theory of the rule of law will be developed in the pages that follow. 
For now, the important point about realism is that a citizen subject to law 
and a lawyer representing a client may conceivably adopt a range of 
interpretive attitudes toward the law. However, the law cannot specify in 
advance the interpretive attitude one is obligated to adopt. A significant 
normative question is therefore left open, concerning the interpretive 
attitude a lawyer ought to take with respect to the law. A client or lawyer 
may act as the proverbial Holmesian bad man, interested only in knowing 
the severity and likelihood of potential sanctions.10 A client or lawyer 
might be interested in knowing what the law requires, not just what it 
begrudgingly allows, but even in that case the law may admit a range of 
interpretations, and the answer to the question “is it legally permissible 
to do X?” may depend on how aggressively one is willing to push the law’s 
boundaries. 
Lawyers serve in advisory roles throughout the Executive Branch. 
The most studied are lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), 
which exercises authority delegated by the Attorney General to advise the 
President in his capacity as head of the Executive Branch; a sophisticated 
literature exists analyzing the duties of lawyers in the OLC as a matter of 
constitutional law.11 In addition, lawyers in the White House Counsel’s 
Office provide legal advice concerning political appointments to 
Executive Branch agencies, conflicts of interest and other ethical 
obligations of presidential staff, the President’s relationship with the 
Justice Department and Congress, and presidential authority generally.12 
There are also, of course, thousands of career civil-service lawyers 
employed within government, some of whom exercise significant 
compliance and policy-making responsibilities.13 The question is what 
ethical responsibilities, as a matter of legal regulation and normative 
ethical theory, do these lawyers have when dealing with a President who 
 
Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1202 (2015). 
 10. Holmes famously proposed that if you want to know what the law is, you should ask a bad 
man. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–62 (1897). 
 11. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1448, 1451 (2010); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007) (by examining the actions taken by the 
Bush Administration, Professor Johnsen analyzes executive branch legal interpretation and builds 
upon a best practices statement for the White House Office of Legal Counsel); Pillard, supra note 2 
(examining the White House Office of Legal Counsel’s “torture memos” to illustrate how executive 
branch lawyers failed to provide interpretations in good faith of governing law). 
 12. See, e.g., Maryanne Borrelli et al., The White House Counsel’s Office, in THE WHITE HOUSE 
WORLD: TRANSITIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND OFFICE OPERATIONS 193 (Martha Joynt Kumar & Terry 
Sullivan, eds., 2003). 
 13. See, e.g., David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 21, 23 (2012) 
(focusing on “civil service legalism”); Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84 (1998) (describing lawyers in the “mixing zone” between the high-level civil 
service layer and the bottom of the thin layer of political appointees). 
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appears to take an unusually dismissive stance toward legal limitations 
on his executive power. This is not another discussion of whether 
“judicial supremacy” or “departmentalism” is the best conception of the 
constitutional obligations of government officials.14 Rather, the issue is 
the ethical obligations of lawyers as lawyers, when they are advising 
government decisionmakers. What constrains the lawyer in taking an 
aggressive interpretive stance? The public interest?15 The President’s 
preferences? Something inherent in the concept of law or the political 
value of the rule of law? Lawyers advising the President need some 
normative theoretical response. 
Historical practices do not reveal a consensus on the appropriate 
stance a legal advisor should take with respect to the law. George 
Washington is reported to have told his first Attorney General, Edmund 
Randolph, that he wished for a “skilled, neutral expounder of the law 
rather than a political advisor.”16 This has been described as a  
quasi-judicial role, and has been advanced by some high-level 
government lawyers as the ideal for all legal advisors.17 Andrew Jackson, 
on the other hand, supposedly said to his chief legal advisor, “You must 
find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney General who 
 
 14. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (interpreting the founding of the United States, emphasizing the ideals of 
popular sovereignty, and illustrating how personal and active living under the Constitution was for 
early Americans); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding 
Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 43 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992) (analyzing the Court’s use of the 
Chevron Test in understanding how much deference the modern court gives to the executive branch’s 
interpretation of laws); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate 
Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986) (arguing the weight of judicial supremacy, 
legislative supremacy, and departmentalism, which ultimately advocates for departmentalism); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 
GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (arguing against judicial supremacy and for the executive branch’s co-equal 
interpretive authority with the courts); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and 
Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373 (1994) 
(responding to Michael Stokes Paulsen’s article, The Most Dangerous Branch, and a questioning of 
Paulsen and his critics); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) 
(challenging traditional American views of judicial review and judicial supremacy by urging for the 
creation of a populist constitutional law, in which judicial declarations are given no special 
consideration). 
 15. In an influential article, Geoffrey Miller argues that government lawyers should not act on 
their own conception of the public interest, because the Constitution establishes a procedure for 
approximating the content of this ideal, through elections, political appointment of agency heads, and 
so on. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1293, 1294–95 (1987). 
 16. Griffin B. Bell, Office of Attorney General’s Client Relationship, 36 BUS. LAW. 791, 791 (1981). 
 17. See Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office 
of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1309 (2000) (quoting President Franklin Pierce’s Attorney 
General, Caleb Cushing). 
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will.”18 Repeated statements by the President indicate that his 
expectations for legal advisors are much closer to Jackson’s than 
Washington’s. To be clear, I believe there is nothing wrong with 
government lawyers helping their clients come up with novel and creative 
ways to accomplish their objectives.19 A President may require the 
lawyers in his administration to be flexible, open-minded, and even a bit 
aggressive in looking for lawful alternative means to implement the 
President’s policies. However, there is a difference between doggedly 
seeking a lawful solution to problems facing a President and his 
administration and assisting government officials in unlawful conduct. 
Legal realism compounds the problem of prescribing interpretive 
attitudes for legal advisors. This Article contends that a normative model 
of legal advising can be constructed, not from history or theory alone, but 
from a constructive interpretation of the law governing lawyers. 
The constraining function of the law governing lawyers is 
surprisingly underappreciated in the literature on government lawyers’ 
advising function. This law, including state rules of professional conduct, 
establishes limitations on what lawyers ethically may do while 
representing any client, including a government official.20 Government 
lawyers who consider only the constitutional law that applies to an issue 
may overlook the rules of professional conduct that apply to all lawyers 
qua lawyers. Some of these norms may be systematically under-enforced. 
For example, the rule requiring a lawyer to give independent advice to a 
client, even if unwelcome,21 is unlikely to be the frequent basis for a 
disciplinary grievance filed by the client against the lawyer. It is more 
likely that the client will simply fire the lawyer or ignore the lawyer’s 
advice. This does not mean, however, that the duty to provide 
independent advice is somehow not a genuine one. It is a familiar insight 
that under-enforced political rights merely shift responsibility from the 
 
 18. CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF 
LEGAL POLICY 18 (1992). The quote is apocryphal but its persistence “stems from its power as parable. 
Every attorney general knows that the day may come when the president will make the blunt point 
Jackson supposedly made to Taney.” HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON 
TERROR 26 (2009). 
 19. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 35; Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the 
Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17 (1995) (arguing that the role of White House Counsel should be more 
realistic in its representation of the President and the Office and the counsel’s role should be 
determined by ordinary incentive structures, rather than by professional norms or legal 
requirements). 
 20. I intend to focus here on the regulation of government lawyers as lawyers, and will not take 
into account statutes and regulations that apply to all government employees, including lawyers. This 
Article does not consider, for example, the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 101, et seq., or 
statutory conflict of interest rules such as 18 U.S.C. § 207. 
 21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). Comment 1 to Rule 2.1 states: 
“Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to 
confront. . . . However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that 
the advice will be unpalatable to the client.” Id. 
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judiciary to other institutional actors.22 Similarly, in the case of  
under-enforced professional duties, lawyers themselves must take up the 
slack where state disciplinary authorities do not have the resources to 
fully enforce the rules of conduct. Otherwise the claim of lawyers to 
belong to a profession is nothing more than a self-serving rhetorical 
effort at legitimating its relative freedom from intrusive regulation by 
other institutions.23 In any event, no complete account of the ethical 
obligations of government lawyers can proceed without a thorough 
understanding of the legal regulation of lawyers. 
In the months following the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) were called upon to 
provide legal advice concerning the treatment of detainees. They 
provided advisory memoranda on the permissibility of the use of  
so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques.” This advice subsequently 
came under scrutiny from the Justice Department’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (“OPR”).24 The OPR concluded that two lawyers, John Yoo 
and Jay Bybee, engaged in professional misconduct by failing to provide 
“thorough, objective, and candid” legal analysis.25 A senior lawyer in the 
Justice Department declined to adopt the OPR’s findings,26 for reasons 
 
 22. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE 93–128 (2004); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing that when the federal judiciary refuses 
to enforce constitutional norms out of concern for institutional issues, Congress and state courts must 
be allowed to step in and enforce the norm to the extent that it is valid and enforceable). 
 23. For examples of powerful arguments supporting this notion, see Susan P. Koniak, The Law 
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992) (arguing that the legal profession’s vision of 
ethical conduct¾its nomos¾is only one among a plurality of competing ethical visions); Richard L. Abel, 
Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 667 (1981). 
 24. See, e.g., BRUFF, supra note 18; GOLDSMITH, supra note 11 (critiquing the Bush 
Administration justifications for their inflation of presidential powers and the legal advice provided to 
the Administration with regards to such acts as enhanced interrogation techniques and wire tapping 
American citizens); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008) (narrating an account of the United States’ 
involvement in pursing terrorists and the impact of the key players’ exploitation of the September  
11 attacks to further an agenda to enhance executive powers); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY 162–205 (2007); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
AMERICAN VALUES (2008) (investigating the Rumsfeld Memo, authorizing controversial interrogation 
techniques, served as a divergence from the Geneva Convention and the Torture Convention, and 
holding key players in the Bush Administration accountable for their failure to abide by international 
law); W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: The 2008 F.W. Wickwire 
Memorial Lecture, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 247 (2008). 
 25. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESP., REPORT: INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF 
LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S 
USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 260 (2009). 
 26. See Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Attorney Gen., 
on Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in 
the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (Jan. 5, 2010). 
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discussed below,27 but stated that it was a close question and the advice 
provided by the lawyers represents an “unfortunate chapter in the history 
of the Office of Legal Counsel.”28 As I will argue, many aspects of the OPR 
report’s analysis of the duty to provide objective legal advice are sound, 
and represent not an aspirational standard for Department of Justice 
lawyers; they are basic, mandatory obligations for all lawyers.29 Lawyers 
in the current administration should carefully consider this 
interpretation of the rules of professional conduct and the background 
law of lawyering. To put the point more sharply, this Article might be 
seen as a roadmap for ex post professional discipline for lawyers in the 
Trump administration who engage in similar abusive manipulation of the 
law on behalf of their political superiors. More positively, it can be 
regarded as an ex ante guide for government lawyers to avoid discipline, 
or who are considering responses such as whistleblowing and 
resignation. 
Having said that, I am well aware of the risk of using disciplinary 
proceedings to re-litigate political disputes. Courts and disciplinary 
authorities are properly reluctant to second-guess the professional 
judgment of lawyers, even in ordinary private-client representations. 
They should be even more reluctant to become involved if disciplinary 
proceedings or lawsuits are being “weaponized” in a political conflict. The 
government would not be well served by lawyers who fear being caught 
up in time-consuming, expensive disciplinary proceedings for giving 
candid advice that turned out to be a political liability. The risk of creating 
a chilling effect on lawyers providing unpopular advice is not to be 
disregarded. But the answer cannot be that no institution will serve to 
monitor the compliance of lawyers with legal and ethical standards. The 
legal profession claims to be self-regulating, not unregulated.30 Someone 
has to guard the guardians of the rule of law within the government. The 
political ideal of the rule of law provides ethical guidance or constraint to 
government lawyers that is, at least in principle, independent of the 
policy preferences of the President. However, one must first disentangle 
it from a great deal of baggage, ranging from the assumption that if there 
is not one right answer to a question of law, then there are no ethical 
constraints on a lawyer’s advice, to the assumption that lawyers serving 
as counselors must reason as though they were writing a judicial opinion. 
 
 27. See infra Part II.D. 
 28. Margolis, supra note 26, at 67. 
 29. See id. at 68 (“. . . OPR’s analysis in this case depends on an analytical standard that reflects 
the Department’s high expectations of its OLC attorneys rather than the somewhat lower standards 
imposed by applicable Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003) (“The legal profession’s 
relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government.”). 
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Competent professional representation does not require getting the right 
answer, nor does it depend on a strong conception of legal determinacy. 
Part I argues that lawyers in the Trump Administration will continue 
to experience intense pressure to compromise their ethical 
responsibilities. Several episodes early in the administration, including 
the firing of Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, the even more troubling 
firing of Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Director James Comey, 
and Trump’s anger at his own Attorney General Jeff Sessions for 
following established procedures, reveal the President’s contempt for the 
ideal of the impartial administration of the law. These episodes are 
consistent with much of Trump’s rhetoric as a candidate, including his 
promise to pursue a politically motivated prosecution against Hillary 
Clinton.31 Although his penchant for speaking hyperbolically is well 
known, it appears that Trump meant exactly what he said in many cases. 
Thus, for government lawyers who find themselves caught between their 
professional obligations and the demands of political superiors, the 
remainder of the article is intended as a roadmap to the doctrinal and 
theoretical basis for legal liability and criticism in ethical terms. 
Part II sets out the legal basis for disciplining government lawyers 
who provide assistance to unlawful conduct. It considers numerous 
contested issues in the law of lawyering, including the disciplinary 
authority of state courts, the identity of the client of government lawyers, 
whether government and private lawyers have different ethical 
obligations, the requirement of providing candid advice, confidentiality 
and whistleblowing, and the permission of lawyers to withdraw from 
employment. The aim is not simply to provide an overview of the 
governing law. Rather, the discussion is intended to address several 
specific issues that have been controversial, argue for the best resolution 
of each of them, and then to draw the analysis together into a large-scale 
“immanent rationality” of the legal regulation of government lawyers.32 
The conclusion of this analysis is a constructive ethical vision of the 
responsibilities of government lawyers as having fiduciary duties 
including loyal client service, creative problem-solving, competence and 
independence in advising, and respect for the rule of law. Government 
lawyers are not required, or even permitted, to act directly on what they 
perceive to be the public interest, or their own moral or political 
commitments. Rather, as agents of democratically accountable 
 
 31. See Benjamin Wittes, Grab ‘Em by the Constitution: Trump and the Justice Department, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016, 3:07 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/grab-em-constitution-trump-and 
-justice-department (quoting numerous reports of then-candidate Trump’s statements that Clinton 
was guilty of crimes and would be prosecuted for them). 
 32. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 
949, 956–57 (1988). 
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government officials they should be guided by the President’s priorities 
and the bounds of the law. 
As Part III elaborates, however, the concept of the rule of law 
imposes significant constraints on legal advising. This thesis is 
sometimes interpreted¾wrongly¾as requiring an implausible 
conception of neutrality, objectivity, or right answers to legal questions. 
In fact, the rule of law is fundamentally about reason-giving.33 The rule 
of law ideally requires that the exercise of government power be justified 
by a reasonable application of relevant legal authorities. Lawyers and 
scholars tend to focus on the conclusion of a legal argument instead of on 
the word “reasonable.” Ethical legal advising is characterized by a 
practice of reason-giving that responds to considerations of publicity, 
generality, clarity, impartiality, and the democratic process. The rule of 
law serves as a regulative ideal, and that is the vision of ethical legal 
advising defended in this Article. 
I.  TRUMP’S THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW 
Criticisms of lawyers for the President tend to reflect disagreement 
with that President as a matter of ideology.34 Distinguishing between a 
politically neutral critique of professional conduct and policy-based 
disagreement is particularly difficult when the head of the Executive 
Branch was maddeningly vague about policy during his campaign, and 
continues to be in the early stages of his administration. Complicating 
the analysis of Trump’s views on the rule of law is his tendency to 
exaggerate, play to his base, contradict himself, and speak off the cuff on 
issues about which he knows very little.35 One theme of post-election 
analysis is that Trump’s critics erred by not taking him seriously but 
taking his statement literally, while his supporters took him seriously but 
did not take his statements literally.36 Former campaign manager Corey 
Lewandowski, now a CNN commentator, said of the media, “You guys 
took everything Donald Trump said so literally. And the problem with 
 
 33. For an admirable exception, see Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional 
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003). 
 34. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney 
General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1934 (2008) (“All too commonly, the call for independence functions 
merely to disguise dissatisfaction or disagreement with an administration’s political goals . . . .”). Jay 
Bybee’s brief in response to the OPR Report raises the possibility that “[e]thics charges and bar 
complaints will become the licensed currency of political disagreements.” See Classified Response to 
the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Classified Report Dated July 29, 
2009 at 4, Submitted on Behalf of Judge Jay S. Bybee (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Bybee Response]. 
 35. See, e.g., Philip Bump, Parsing Donald Trump’s Confused, Confusing Explanation of Why 
He Doesn’t “Use” Obamacare, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/25/parsing-donald-trumps-confused-confusing-explanation-of-why-he-
doesnt-use-obamacare/?utm_term=.0d7745b3de95 (quoting Trump seemingly misunderstanding 
the difference between employer-provided insurance and the individual market for health insurance). 
 36. See Salena Zito, Taking Trump Seriously, Not Literally, ATLANTIC, Sept. 23, 2016. 
WENDEL-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:39 AM 
December 2017]            GOV. LAWYERS IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 285 
that is the American people didn’t.”37 Some of the President’s outrageous 
statements and public fights might be nothing more than a way to 
distract attention from actions that might attract controversy 
otherwise.38 On the other hand, some actions of the administration 
suggest that taking the statements of candidate Trump literally was 
entirely warranted. 
Even making allowances for the unscripted nature of Trump’s 
campaign, the likelihood that anyone might misspeak over the course of 
months in the public eye, and his practice of stirring up controversy as a 
way of changing the story when his conduct is in question, Trump has 
been consistent in his disdain for the traditions of separation of powers, 
the limitations of presidential power, and the rule of law. Following is a 
non-exhaustive list of statements made by Trump, either during his 
campaign or the transitional phase prior to Inauguration Day, or his 
actions as President, which tend to reveal his beliefs about the 
relationship between power and the lawful means of exercising it. 
Relying on the principle of charity,39 American citizens must assume that 
the statements of a presidential candidate communicate information 
about how the candidate intends to act in office. Even if a statement like 
Trump’s threat to “open up” libel laws cannot be taken literally, because 
the President has no power to alter the state tort and federal 
constitutional law of defamation,40 the statement does communicate a 
message about the candidate’s attitude toward freedom of the press. My 
claim is simply that a lawyer deciding whether to work in the Trump 
administration would be well advised to consider what the statements 
below indicate about the President-elect’s attitude toward legal 
constraints on his power. 
 
 37. Jonah Goldberg, Opinion, Take Trump Seriously but Not Literally? How, Exactly?, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/ 
la-oe-goldberg-trump-seriously-literally-20161206-story.html. 
 38. Washington Post columnist Dana Milbank refers to this as the “dead cat” strategy to distract 
attention from aggressive moves to consolidate Trump’s power. Dana Milbank, Opinion, Don’t Get 
Distracted by Trump’s ‘Dead Cats,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2017/01/25/e59a8ab6-e34a-11e6-ba11-63c4b4fb5a63_story.html. 
 39. DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 197 (2d ed. 2001). 
 40. See, e.g., Hadas Gold, Donald Trump: We’re Going to ‘Open Up’ Libel Laws, POLITICO, Feb. 
26, 2016, (reporting Trump’s statement: “One of the things I’m going to do if I win, and I hope we do 
and we’re certainly leading. I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative 
and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. We’re going to open up those 
libel laws. So when The New York Times writes a hit piece which is a total disgrace or when The 
Washington Post, which is there for other reasons, writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money 
instead of having no chance of winning because they’re totally protected . . . .”). Libel is, of course, a 
matter of state tort law with extensive constitutional limitations. See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF 
DEFAMATION § 1:16 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 2016). Short of appointing enough Supreme Court Justices 
with an inclination to overrule New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), there is virtually 
nothing the President could do to affect the scope of a media defendant’s liability for defamation in a 
lawsuit brought by a public figure or public official. 
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A. TRUMP VS. THE FREE PRESS 
During the campaign, Trump repeatedly expressed frustration with 
the way he was covered by the mainstream media. The Washington Post 
was a frequent target of his attacks. Before he hit back by revoking the 
paper’s press credentials,41 he explicitly threatened to retaliate against 
owner Jeff Bezos by targeting Amazon, which Mr. Bezos also owns, for 
scrutiny under tax and antitrust laws.42 It is not clear from Trump’s 
statement why he believes Amazon has an antitrust problem. The test for 
an antitrust violation is whether Amazon is engaging in illegal behavior 
that harms consumers, and Trump did not specify what this might be.43 
After taking office, an unnamed source within the administration stated 
that Trump regarded a pending merger between AT&T and CNN’s parent 
company, Time Warner, as potential “leverage” over CNN, the 
administration’s “adversary.”44 Again, the threat was to direct 
government lawyers to reach a negative judgment regarding the anti-
competitive effects of a merger as a means of retaliating for negative 
press coverage. Mr. Bezos and CNN have reason to take these sorts of 
threats seriously. An investigation by a federal agency would be costly 
and disruptive. The Federal Trade Commission is an independent 
agency, but the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is under 
the control of the politically appointed Attorney General. Trump’s 
statements may reasonably be interpreted as a warning to the owner of a 
high-profile media platform to tone down criticism of the President. 
Along with Trump’s aggressive stance toward the press, including 
frequent episodes of banning journalists who criticized him during the 
 
 41. See Margaret Sullivan, Does It Matter That Donald Trump Has Banned Us? Not in the Way 
You’d Think, WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/ 
does-it-matter-that-donald-trump-has-banned-us-not-in-the-way-youd-think/2016/06/14/ 
e11aa0c2-324f-11e6-95c0-2a6873031302_story.html. 
 42. Paul Farhi, ‘Not an Appropriate Way for a Presidential Candidate to Behave’: Bezos Fires Back 
at Donald Trump, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/not-an-
appropriate-way-for-a-presidential-candidate-to-behave-bezos-fires-back-at-donald-trump/2016/05/ 
18/b72f5054-1d1a-11e6-8c7b-6931e66333e7_story.html. Trump continued to refer to the paper as the 
“Amazon Washington Post” months after taking office. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Opinion, This Column 
Brought to You by the “Amazon Washington Post,” WASH. POST, (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-column-brought-to-you-by-the-amazon-washington-
post/2017/07/25/0189b49c-716f-11e7-8839-ec48ec4cae25_story.html. 
 43. Amazon has been criticized by publishers for setting low prices for electronic versions of books, 
and might be alleged to have engaged in predatory pricing, but it likely would not be found liable because 
it could justify low e-book prices as an investment that drives sales of its Kindle platform. See Zachary C. 
Flood, Antitrust Enforcement in the Developing E-Book Market: Apple, Amazon, and the Future of the 
Publishing Industry, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 879, 897–99 (2016). None of his public statements suggests 
that Trump had the e-book market in mind as Amazon’s “antitrust problem.” 
 44. See Philip Bump, Would the Trump Administration Block a Merger Just to Punish CNN?, 
WASH. POST (July 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/06/ 
would-the-trump-administration-block-a-merger-just-to-punish-cnn. 
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campaign,45 his threats against Amazon and CNN were suggestive of a 
desire to use official power against critics. 
After becoming President, Trump did not change his attitude toward 
a free and vigorous press. In addition to referring to the media as the 
“enemy of the people,”46 tweeting an altered video showing himself 
repeatedly punching a figure with “CNN” superimposed over his face,47 
and repeatedly denouncing hard-hitting coverage as “fake news,”48 he 
renewed his threat to attempt to change the law of defamation to allow 
him to bring lawsuits against media organizations whose coverage he 
deems unfair. Several months into his presidency, his chief of staff stated 
in an interview with ABC News that the administration had been looking 
into a constitutional amendment that would “change the libel laws.”49 As 
a private citizen, Trump sued a book publisher for $5 billion, alleging that 
an authorized biography by writer Tim O’Brien, then a business reporter 
for the New York Times, had understated Trump’s net worth.50 As a 
candidate, Trump threatened to sue the Times for publishing the account 
of two women who accused him of touching them inappropriately.51 
 
 45. See Paul Farhi, Trump Lifts Ban That Excluded the Washington Post and Other News Media, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/trump-lifts-ban-that-
excluded-the-washington-post-and-other-news-media/2016/09/07/29b11d86-7501-11e6-8149-
b8d05321db62_story.html (describing denial of press credentials to the Washington Post, BuzzFeed, 
The Daily Beast, Politico, and The Huffington Post). 
 46. See Andrew Higgins, Trump Embraces ‘Enemy of the People,’ a Phrase with a Fraught 
History, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/26/world/europe/ 
trump-enemy-of-the-people-stalin.html. 
 47. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Tweets a Video of Him Wrestling ‘CNN’ to the Ground, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/02/business/media/ 
trump-wrestling-video-cnn-twitter.html. 
 48. See Rebecca Morin, Trump Accuses “Fake News” Media of Making Up Sources, POLITICO (May 28, 
2017, 8:59 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/28/trump-fake-news-media-238894. 
 49. See Eugene Volokh, Opinion, White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus on Changes to Libel Law, 
WASH. POST (May 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/01/ 
white-house-chief-of-staff-reince-priebus-on-changes-to-libellaw. 
 50. See Ian Tuttle, The Litigious¾and Bullying¾Mr. Trump, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 19, 2016, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/431575/donald-trump-tim-obrien-courtroom-story. 
 51. See Alan Rappeport, Donald Trump Threatens to Sue the Times over Article on Unwanted 
Advances, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/us/politics/ 
donald-trump-lawsuit-threat.html. The Assistant General Counsel to the paper wrote a brilliant 
response which, while reiterating the public interest in receiving newsworthy information, also 
pointed out that candidate Trump’s reputational problems were largely of his own making: 
The essence of a libel claim, of course, is the protection of one’s reputation. Mr. Trump has 
bragged about his non-consensual sexual touching of women. He has bragged about 
intruding on beauty pageant contestants in their dressing rooms. He acquiesced to a radio 
host’s request to discuss Mr. Trump’s own daughter as a “piece of ass.” Multiple women not 
mentioned in our article have publicly come forward to report on Mr. Trump’s unwanted 
advances. Nothing in our article has had the slightest effect on the reputation that Mr. 
Trump, through his own words and actions, has already created for himself. 
  See Letter from David E. McCraw, Vice President & Assistant Gen. Counsel, New York Times, 
to Mark E. Kasowitz, Attorney, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP (Oct. 13, 2016), 
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There is little reason to believe that the President shares the “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”52 
B. DELEGITIMIZING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
One of the most bitterly controversial moments of the campaign was 
Trump’s criticism of Judge Gonzalo Curiel, a federal district court judge 
presiding over a class action fraud lawsuit against Trump University. 
Trump not only stated that the judge would be biased because he is 
“Mexican”¾in fact, Judge Curiel is an American citizen, born in Indiana 
to parents who immigrated to the United States from Mexico—but he 
issued a vague threat promising reprisal if he were elected.53 Trump 
subsequently intensified his criticism, claiming that Judge Curiel had an 
“absolute conflict” because of Trump’s promise to build a wall on the 
border with Mexico.54 The lawsuits regarding Trump University settled 
after Election Day.55 
A certain amount of criticism of judges by elected officials is a 
healthy part of inter-branch competition and checking of power. 
President Obama did not avoid criticism of the judiciary, and spoke out 
frequently against decisions with which he disagreed, such as the 
Supreme Court’s Citizens United opinion.56 What is novel and troubling 
about the episode with Judge Curiel is the ad hominem nature of the 
criticism, indicating Trump’s tendency to personalize disputes; his 
assumption that the only reason he may have lost on summary judgment 
is that the judge is a “hater” or is of Mexican heritage; the utter lack of 
any engagement with policy issues in the litigation; and the threat of 
some unspecified payback against the judge if he should be elected 
President.57 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/13/us/politics/david-mccraw-trump-letter.html. As 
of Nov. 2017, Kasowitz has not filed the threatened libel lawsuit. 
 52. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 53. Adam Liptak, Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-constitution-
power.html. 
 54. See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents ‘Absolute Conflict,’ 
WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2016, 10:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-
attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442. 
 55. See Steve Eder, Donald Trump Agrees to Pay $25 Million in Trump University Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us/politics/ 
trump-university.html. 
 56. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE 
RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 293–94 (2016) (reporting on Obama’s criticism of the case during the State 
of the Union address, and Justice Alito’s response). 
 57. See David Post, Opinion, On Donald Trump and the Rule of Law, WASH. POST (May 29, 2016), 
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In one of the first major initiatives of the new administration, 
President Trump issued an executive order prohibiting entry into the 
United States by all refugees and all citizens of seven majority-Muslim 
countries, even those with lawful permanent residence in the United 
States.58 The travel ban episode serves as a case study in Part IV of this 
Article, but on the subject of judicial independence, it is worth noting 
Trump’s reaction to the use of litigation to determine the lawfulness of 
the order. The order was enjoined nationwide by a federal district judge 
in the Western District of Washington, and that injunction was upheld 
by the Ninth Circuit.59 Trump reacted to the district judge’s order by 
tweeting: “The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes 
law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be 
overturned!”60 Judge Bybee, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of 
en banc rehearing regarding the panel’s denial of a stay pending appeal, 
concluded with a remarkable defense of judicial  
independence—remarkable because it was addressed to a sitting 
President: 
The personal attacks on the distinguished district judge and our 
colleagues were out of all bounds of civic and persuasive  
discourse¾particularly when they came from the parties. It does no 
credit to the arguments of the parties to impugn the motives or the 
competence of the members of this court; ad hominem attacks are not 
a substitute for effective advocacy. Such personal attacks treat the court 
as though it were merely a political forum in which bargaining, 
compromise, and even intimidation are acceptable principles. The 
courts of law must be more than that, or we are not governed by law at 
all.61 
C. BRINGING BACK “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” 
During the campaign, Trump spoke out in favor of returning to the 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” which had been determined during 
the George W. Bush administration to constitute legally prohibited 
torture. Trump stated that “torture works” and that he would “authorize 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/29/on-donald-trump-and-the-
rule-of-law. 
 58. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Nicholas Kulish, & Alan Feuer, Judge Blocks Trump Order on 
Refugees amid Chaos and Outcry Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-
challenges-to-trumps-immigration-order.html. 
 59. See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), 
stay pending appeal denied, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017). 
 60. Amy B. Wang, Trump Lashes out at ‘So-Called Judge’ Who Temporarily Blocked Travel Ban, WASH. 
POST: THE FIX (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/ 
trump-lashes-out-at-federal-judge-who-temporarily-blocked-travel-ban. 
 61. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1185 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
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something beyond waterboarding” if elected President.62 During one of 
the Republican primary debates, Trump stated: 
They then came to me, what do you think of waterboarding? I said it’s 
fine. If we want to go stronger, I’d go stronger, too . . . . We should go 
for waterboarding and tougher than waterboarding.63 
But then he walked his position back somewhat, reportedly after a 
conversation with his Defense Secretary nominee, General James Mattis. 
Despite having said that “only a stupid person would say it doesn’t 
work,”64 Trump apparently was persuaded by General Mattis’s contrary 
view.65 As with other contradictory campaign statements, it is hard to 
know what Trump really thinks, but experience with the Bush 
Administration shows that strong advisors can effectively make policy 
decisions.66 Trump, with no military experience of his own, may be even 
more likely to defer to military and national security professionals in 
making policy decisions about the treatment of detainees. Perhaps his 
previous statements were for show and Trump will not direct the Central 
Intelligence Agency Director nor Secretary of Defense to waterboard 
detainees.67 But the possibility remains that he might, which raises the 
question to be considered in the remainder of this Article, namely what 
ethical responsibilities government lawyers would have in that event. 
D. INTERFERING WITH AN INVESTIGATION: THE COMEY FIRING 
On May 9, 2017, President Trump fired the Director of the FBI, 
James B. Comey.68 Comey’s actions figured prominently in the 2016 
general election campaign, with his public statements about whether 
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email had 
violated federal law. Comey initially said, in July, that Clinton’s handling 
 
 62. Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump on Waterboarding: ‘Torture Works,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/17/donald-trump-on-
waterboarding-torture-works. 
 63. Tierney Sneed, Trump: ‘We Should Go for Waterboarding and Tougher than 
Waterboarding,’ TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar. 3, 2016, 10:22 PM), http://talkingpoints 
memo.com/livewire/trump-waterboarding. 
 64. See Jenna Johnson, Trump Says ‘Torture Works,’ Backs Waterboarding and ‘Much Worse,’ WASH. 
POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-torture-works-backs-
waterboarding-and-much-worse/2016/02/17/4c9277be-d59c-11e5-b195 2e29a4e13425_story.html. 
 65. Matt Apuzzo & James Risen, Donald Trump Faces Obstacles to Resuming Waterboarding, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/us/politics/trump-
waterboarding-torture.html. 
 66. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 24, at 120–24 (detailing the roles of Vice President Dick Cheney 
and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in formulating interrogation policy).  
 67. See Jack Goldsmith, Trump’s Self-Defeating Executive Order on Interrogation, LAWFARE 
(Jan. 25, 2017, 12:13 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumps-self-defeating-executive-order-
interrogation. 
 68. See Michael D. Sheer & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Director James Comey Is Fired by Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2017, at A1. 
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of classified information was “careless” but not criminal, but in the 
closing weeks of the campaign he announced that the FBI was reopening 
the investigation after classified emails supposedly were found on the 
laptop of former Representative Anthony Weiner.69 This late 
announcement is widely perceived to have shifted the dynamics of the 
election at a critical moment.70 At the time, Trump praised Comey, saying 
it took “a lot of guts” to make the announcement.71 
Comey was also leading the investigation by the FBI into alleged 
contacts between Russian intelligence operatives and the Trump 
campaign. In initial accounts, White House officials stated that Trump 
fired Comey on the recommendation of recently confirmed Deputy 
Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein. “It was all [Rosenstein],” said press 
secretary Sean Spicer, and stated that he was unaware of a direction from 
any of Rosenstein’s superiors (including Trump or Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, who had recused himself from the Russia investigation) to 
consider Comey’s termination as FBI Director.72 A subsequent statement 
suggested, however, that Trump had been “strongly inclined to remove” 
Comey, and made a final decision after receiving Rosenstein’s memo.73 
Then Trump himself changed the explanation, stating in an interview 
with Lester Holt of NBC News that he would have fired Comey regardless 
of what Mr. Rosenstein said, explicitly referring to the Russia 
investigation: “[W]hen I decided to just do it, I said to myself, I said, ‘You 
know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story.’”74 
Trump told Russian officials in a meeting the next day that firing the “nut 
job” had taken off the pressure of the investigation.75 Eventually, Mr. 
Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller III as special prosecutor to 
investigate possible coordination between Russian officials and 
associates of Trump.76 
 
 69. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Michael S. Schmidt, Adam Goldman, & Eric Lichtblau, Comey Tried 
to Shield the F.B.I. from Politics. Then He Shaped an Election, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/us/politics/james-comey-election.html. 
 70. See, e.g., Sean McElwee, Matt McDermott, & Will Jordan, 4 Pieces of Evidence Showing FBI 
Director James Comey Cost Clinton the Election, VOX (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:40 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/11/14215930/comey-email-election-clinton-campaign. 
 71. See, e.g., Nolan D. McCaskill, Trump Praises Comey for Having ‘a Lot of Guts,’ POLITICO (Oct. 
31, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/trump-praises-james-comey-230542. 
 72. See, e.g., Jenna Johnson, After Trump Fired Comey, White House Staff Scrambled to Explain 
Why, WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (May 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-politics/wp/2017/05/10/as-trump-fired-comey-his-staff-scrambled-to-explain-why. 
 73. See Peter Baker & Michael D. Shear, Trump Shifts Rationale for Firing Comey, Calling Him 
a ‘Showboat,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/us/politics/ 
trump-comey-showboat-fbi.html. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing ‘Nut Job’ Comey Eased Pressure 
from Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/05/19/us/politics/trump-russia-comey.html. 
 76. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett et al., Deputy Attorney General Appoints Special Counsel to Oversee 
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E. THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES: WHAT LAWYERS MAY  
BE CALLED UPON TO DO 
After a few months into his presidency, it has become clear that 
some of Trump’s campaign statements were pure bluster, while in other 
cases his administration’s ineptitude thwarted his stated ambitions.77 
Construction has not begun on the promised border wall between the 
United States and Mexico,78 Trump’s “secret plan to defeat ISIS” strongly 
resembled the Obama Administration’s approach,79 and arguably was 
further weakened by the decision to end covert aid to Syrian rebel 
groups,80 and Trump angered some of his supporters by going back on a 
campaign promise to deport undocumented immigrants protected by the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (“DACA”).81 The Comey 
firing, however, as well as the earlier dismissal of Sally Yates as Acting 
Attorney General (to be discussed further in Part IV, below), show that 
Trump is willing to put considerable pressure on government lawyers he 
considers insufficiently loyal.82 Jack Goldsmith, the former head of the 
OLC, observes that senior, politically appointed government lawyers 
often feel a sense of loyalty to the President and alignment with his policy 
 
Probe of Russian Interference in Election, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/deputy-attorney-general-appoints-
special-counsel-to-oversee-probe-of-russian-interference-in-election/2017/05/17/302c1774-3b49-
11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html. 
 77. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Malevolence Tempered by Incompetence: Trump’s Horrifying 
Executive Order on Refugees and Visas, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2017, 10:58 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/malevolence-tempered-incompetence-trumps-horrifying-executive-order-
refugees-and-visas. 
 78. See Noah Bierman & Brian Bennett, Trump’s ‘Big Beautiful Wall’ Is Not in the Spending Plan. 
Will It Ever Get Built?, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/ 
la-na-pol-trump-wall-20170501-story.html. 
 79. Brian P. McKeon, Trump’s ‘Secret Plan’ to Defeat ISIS Looks a Lot Like Obama’s, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (May 31, 2017, 3:44 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/31/trumps-secret-plan-to-defeat-
isis-looks-a-lot-like-obamas. 
 80. See David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, & Ben Hubbard, Trump Ends Covert Aid to Syrian Rebels 
Trying to Topple Assad, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/07/19/world/middleeast/cia-arming-syrian-rebels.html.  
 81. See Dara Lind, It’s Official: Trump Is Keeping 750,000 Unauthorized Immigrants Safe from 
Deportation, VOX (June 16, 2017, 12:04 PM), https://www.vox.com/ 
policy-and-politics/2017/6/16/15815850/trump-daca-dapa-dreamers. Trump subsequently changed 
his mind and ended DACA; he strongly suggested, however, that he would support Congressional 
authorization for continuing the program. See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump 
Moves to End DACA and Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-immigration.html. 
Trump and Senate leaders later met and agreed that there would be no reauthorization of DACA in 
omnibus spending bills being considered. See Jordain Carney, Trump, GOP Senators: No DACA Deal 
in Spending Bill, THE HILL (Nov. 2, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/ 
358448-trump-gop-senators-no-daca-deal-in-spending-bill. 
 82. See Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, ‘Looking like a Liar or a Fool’: What It Means to 
Work for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://nytimes.com/2017/05/12/us/politics/ 
trump-sean-spicer-sarah-huckabee-sanders.html. 
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goals, while all lawyers face pressure to be team players lest they find 
themselves marginalized in the decisionmaking process.83 
Suppose that a high-ranking lawyer¾a section chief or assistant 
chief with the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, 
Telecommunications and Media Enforcement Section¾gets word from 
a politically appointed supervising lawyer in the DOJ that it is a priority 
for the President to “look into” potential anticompetitive effects of 
Amazon’s purchase of Whole Foods. Suppose further that “this merger is 
a no-brainer to approve under existing antitrust doctrines.”84 Perhaps 
existing doctrine might be criticized, but as the law stands, the merger 
should be approved. The lawyer nevertheless is savvy enough to 
understand the tacit message communicated by her supervisor: The 
President wants to pressure Amazon’s Jeff Bezos to rein in the so-called 
“Amazon Washington Post.” The lawyer believes there are sufficient 
grounds to investigate the merger. She is also experienced enough to 
know how to delay proceedings, run up costs and generally create a 
headache for Amazon, even if the merger is ultimately approved. What 
should the lawyer do? The sections that follow consider the answers given 
in the law governing lawyers and in the political values that support the 
ethical rights and duties of government lawyers. 
II.  GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
This Article uses the term “law governing lawyers” instead of 
referring to the rules of professional conduct as “ethics rules” or the 
subject as “legal ethics.” The law of lawyering is positive law, just like the 
securities or antitrust laws. One may lament that “codes” of ethics are no 
more than “mere” law, or that legal ethics as taught in law schools is not 
actually about ethics,85 but the fact remains that courts and disciplinary 
authorities interpret the rules of professional conduct like any other body 
of positive law.86 Sometimes the law of lawyering requires lawyers to do 
 
 83. Jack Goldsmith, Lawyerly Integrity in the Trump Administration, LAWFARE (May 14, 2017, 
7:21 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawyerly-integrity-trump-administration. 
 84. See Hal Singer, Will Amazon-Whole Foods Survive Antitrust Scrutiny Under Trump?, 
FORBES: WASH. BYTES (July 3, 2017, 8:22 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washington 
bytes/2017/07/03/will-amazon-whole-foods-survive-antitrust-scrutiny-under-trump/ 
#1009b1128e1e (discussing the potential harms of Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods).  
 85. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1043 (2007); William 
H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65 (1991); Stephen Gillers, What We 
Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.  
243 (1985).  
 86. See, e.g., Timothy P. Terrell, Toward Duty-Based Lawyering?: Rethinking the Dangers of 
Lawyer Civil Disobedience in the Current Era of Regulation, 54 ALA. L. REV. 831 (2003). See W. 
Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics Is About the Law, Not Morality or Justice: A Reply to Critics, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 727 (2012); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics as “Political Moralism” or the Morality of 
Politics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1413 (2008) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
(2007)). 
WENDEL-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/17  12:39 AM 
294 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:275 
things that an ordinarily decent human being would do anyway. In other 
cases, however, it represents a balancing of interests with which one 
might have reasonable disagreement. One might of course adopt a 
critical, external, “ethical” stance toward the duties of government 
lawyers, and make a normative argument that they ought to be different. 
The subject of this Article, however, is the scheme of regulation that 
actually exists, as a matter of positive law. 
A. ARE GOVERNMENT LAWYERS SPECIAL? 
It is an uncontroversial proposition in mainstream American legal 
thought that government lawyers have greater responsibilities to 
pursue the common good or the public interest than their counterparts 
in private practice, who represent non-governmental persons and 
entities.87 
It is far from uncontroversial that government lawyers have a 
greater responsibility to pursue the common good than lawyers 
representing clients in private practice.88 It seems instead that the 
mainstream position is that a government lawyer’s obligation to the 
public good is no stronger than a private lawyer’s.89 The Restatement of 
the Law Governing Lawyers takes the position that the basic duty of a 
lawyer representing a government entity is to “act in a manner 
reasonably calculated to advance the lawful objectives of the client entity 
as defined by persons authorized to instruct the lawyer on behalf of the 
client.”90 This is exactly the same duty that applies to lawyers 
representing private organizational clients such as corporations.91 
It is certainly true that prosecutors have distinctive ethical 
obligations.92 For one thing, because charging decisions are almost 
entirely unregulated by courts,93 prosecutors essentially adjudicate the 
 
 87. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government 
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2009). 
 88. See Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?,  
9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 238 (2000) (“To the extent that government lawyers consider these 
questions, they do not necessarily agree; nor is there a consensus in the professional literature.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility 
in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105 (1995); John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion 
Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon,  
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375 (1993); Miller, supra note 15. 
 90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003); LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS §§ 16(1), 21(2), 96. 
 92. A frequently cited dictum from a 1935 Supreme Court decision should be understood in its 
context, as describing the duties of prosecutors. The court said that a government lawyer “is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest . . . is not that 
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); United States v. Batchelder,  
442 U.S. 114 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
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value of cases. Some commentators have even argued they should adopt 
something of a quasi-judicial attitude of neutrality when making 
charging decisions.94 At the very least a prosecutor may not prosecute a 
charge absent probable cause.95 Decisional and statutory law, rules of 
criminal procedure, and rules of professional conduct also impose 
responsibilities such as disclosing exculpatory evidence to the accused,96 
and “confessing error” if there is a procedural irregularity affecting the 
rights of the accused.97 Prosecutors also must reconcile the interests of a 
diverse constituency, including defendants, victims of crime and those 
who are harmed by discriminatory police practices.98 When there is a 
decision that is relatively unconstrained by law, and which implicates the 
tension between the duties “to convict and punish lawbreakers but to 
avoid harming, and certainly to avoid punishing, innocent people,”99 
prosecutors do face a unique ethical obligation to ensure that justice is 
done. 
But not all government lawyers have heightened ethical obligations 
as compared with lawyers in private practice.100 In all cases where 
government attorneys are sanctioned or admonished by a court for 
violating their professional responsibilities, a private lawyer who 
engaged in the same conduct would be subject to the same penalties.101 
 
 94. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate 
Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1700–01 (2000). 
 95. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a). 
 96. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring disclosure of material exculpatory 
evidence); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (requiring disclosure of information potentially 
useful for impeachment of government witnesses); The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012) (requiring 
disclosure of witness statements to defense); PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (requiring disclosure of “all 
evidence or information . . . that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense”). 
 97. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942) (stating that “[t]he public trust reposed 
in the law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error when 
. . . a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent.”). 
 98. R. Michael Cassidy, Some Reflections on Ethics and Plea Bargaining: An Essay in Honor of 
Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 95 (2011); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 57-58 (1991). 
 99. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice?,” 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,  
642 (1999). 
 100. See Green, supra note 88, at 240 (“Unlike in the criminal context, in the civil context it is 
generally not accepted that government lawyers must ‘seek justice.’”); see also Lybbert v. Grant Cty.,  
1 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2000) (representing county in personal-injury action did not act improperly by 
waiting to inform plaintiff that he had served the wrong official until after the statute of limitations 
had run); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387 (1994) (explaining that 
a government lawyer in civil litigation has same obligation as private lawyer and need not disclose to 
opposing counsel in settlement negotiations that statute of limitations has run on opposing party’s 
claim). The consensus in Canada is also that, other than prosecutors, government lawyers do not have 
a higher ethical duty than private lawyers. See Adam M. Dodek, Lawyering at the Intersection of 
Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law, 33 DALHOUSIE 
L.J. 1, 15 (2010). 
 101. See, e.g., Precision Specialty Metals v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (imposing 
sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 on a Justice Department litigator who mischaracterized, by selective 
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In those cases, however, one frequently encounters statements about the 
special obligations of government lawyers. These are, almost without 
exception, nothing more than rhetorical makeweights. For example, in a 
frequently cited D.C. Circuit case,102 Judge Mikva excoriated lawyers for 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for not 
withdrawing an order that interfered with settlement of the litigation.103 
But all of the duties cited by Judge Mikva apply to private as well as to 
government lawyers. It is improper to bring or defend a proceeding 
without a good faith basis in law and fact for doing so.104 Lawyers must 
“make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, consistent with the 
interests of the client,”105 and the interests of FERC would in no way have 
been compromised by vacating the first order. In the course of 
representing a client, lawyers may not employ “means that have no 
substantial purpose other than to . . . delay[] or burden a third person,”106 
and here there was no purpose for continuing to defend the first order; 
as Judge Mikva observed, the only apparent motivation was “the desire 
to pound an opponent into submission.”107 The case does not stand for 
the existence of a freestanding obligation of a government lawyer to 
ensure that justice was done. There was only the obligation of any lawyer 
representing a client in civil litigation to refrain from certain enumerated 
types of abusive conduct. 
It matters a great deal whether statements about the heightened 
duties of government lawyers are merely window dressing. For one thing, 
while judges may think they are aiming at elevating the standards of 
practice of government lawyers, the effect of the differentiation they posit 
may in fact be tacitly to condone an imaginary view of private lawyers’ 
conduct as shady but permissible.108 A greater risk of believing that 
 
quotation, a court’s holding in a brief filed by the government); United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co.,  
11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993) (sanctioning Justice Department lawyers for failing to disclose that expert 
witness had lied about his credentials); Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (criticizing 
lawyer for Department of Labor who did not inform court that divorcing spouses had settled an 
alimony issue, mooting an order garnishing federal employment benefits); United States v. Sumitomo 
Marine and Fire Ins. Co., Ltd., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980) (precluding government from introducing 
evidence as sanction for 18-month delay in complying with discovery order). 
 102. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 962 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 103. Id. at 47. 
 104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
 105. Id. at r. 3.2. 
 106. Id. at r. 4.4(a). 
 107. Freeport-McMoRan, 962 F.2d at 47. 
 108. The Margolis interprets the Office of Professional Responsibility Report as imposing a 
heightened duty on lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel to advise on the issue of torture, the right 
against which is fundamental and the prohibition of which is a jus cogens norm in international law. 
See Margolis, supra note 26, at 12. I do not believe the duty to provide candid, independent advice 
varies according to either the identity of the lawyer’s client (the government, a private corporation, or 
an individual), or the importance of the issue under consideration, even though the consequences of 
an erroneous decision may vary. 
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government lawyers are subject to heightened ethical obligations is that 
one may come to believe the converse¾that government lawyers have 
distinctive ethical permissions. The specific issue of whistleblowing will 
be considered in more detail below,109 but one scholar has read this D.C. 
Circuit case as support for the conclusion that the “higher duty” of 
government lawyers creates an implied exception to the usual obligation 
of confidentiality, permitting disclosures the lawyer believes to be in the 
public interest.110 That is a serious analytic mistake and could lead to 
disciplinary exposure for a lawyer. For the most part, the law governing 
lawyers has evolved away from aspirational and open-ended standards 
such as “appearance of impropriety” and the obligation to do justice.111 
Apart from the special case of prosecutors, the regulation of government 
lawyers looks very much like the regulation of lawyers representing 
private clients. 
On the subject of special roles, it is important to emphasize that the 
analysis in this Article pertains to lawyers serving as advisors, not taking 
positions on behalf of clients in litigated proceedings. Lawyers 
representing clients in litigated matters must make the strongest 
available arguments for the clients’ positions, subject to limitations on 
advancing unmeritorious or frivolous contentions.112 This “principle of 
partisanship”113 follows from the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client 
relationship, which implies duties of loyalty and care owed to the 
client.114 The principle of partisanship is often summarized as “zealous 
advocacy within the bounds of the law.”115 Government lawyers 
appearing in a litigated proceeding in a civil matter on behalf of the 
United States or a particular federal agency or officer are advocates like 
any other. They are duty bound to make vigorous and effective arguments 
for their client’s position. 
But not all lawyers are litigators. The lawyers that are the primary 
concern of this analysis are serving as counselors; they provide advice to 
 
 109. See infra Subpart III.E.3. 
 110. See Jesselyn Radack, The Government Attorney-Whistleblower and the Rule of 
Confidentiality: Compatible at Last, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 140–41 (2003) (discussing 
Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 962 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 111. See, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst?, 
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311 (1987) (lamenting this trend). 
 112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3, 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003); FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 113. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. 
REV. 669 (1978). 
 114. See, e.g., 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15:6 (2017). 
 115. The slogan appeared in the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, which has since 
been replaced in all U.S. jurisdictions with the Model Rules. (California has a quirky sets of rules, 
supplemented by provisions of its civil code, which are based neither on the Model Code nor the Model 
Rules.) The only reference to zealous advocacy in the Model Rules is in Comment 1 to Rule 1.3, on 
diligence. That comment provides: “A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the 
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.” PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3, cmt. 1. 
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government actors on the legality of a proposed course of action.116 As I 
have argued elsewhere, whatever permission lawyers have to urge 
partisan interpretations of the law and facts on a tribunal is grounded in 
the existence of procedures to ensure that one-sided presentations by one 
party are countered by another.117 Adversarial procedures are necessary 
to ensure that judges remain open-minded and consider both sides’ cases 
impartially.118 However, the function of the advocate defines the limits of 
advocacy,119 both within litigation and a fortiori in non-litigation 
contexts. A client may be just as interested as a judge in keeping an open 
mind and not reaching a premature conclusion. Because the client is 
receiving advice from only one side it is essential that the lawyer provide 
a balanced treatment of the law and not just the type of partisan 
argument that would be appropriate in litigation. As discussed further in 
Part II, Subpart D below,120 providing clear, candid, impartial legal 
analysis is one of a lawyer’s core obligations, and that obligation in no 
way resembles the litigators’ duty to zealously advocate for the client.121 
B. DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY¾RULE 8.5 AND THE MCDADE AMENDMENT 
The proposition that a lawyer employed by the federal government 
is subject to discipline in his or her admitting jurisdiction is now clearly 
established. State courts have always asserted the authority to discipline 
lawyers licensed to practice in the jurisdiction, no matter where their 
conduct occurred and, implicitly, no matter the identity of their 
employer.122 They possess this authority as an aspect of the inherent 
 
 116. This is not to say that Trump-specific issues may not also arise for government litigators. For 
example, after the President tweeted several messages that directly contradicted the position taken by 
Justice Department lawyers over the travel-ban executive order, some commentators noted that these 
lawyers would have to be very careful not to make statements of fact they know are false. Given 
Trump’s statement that he intended the order to be a permanent ban on entry, not a temporary pause 
while government agencies improved vetting procedures, a lawyer representing the government in 
litigation would not be able to argue that the President intended for the immigration ban to be 
temporary. See Alison Frankel, Trump Tweets Could Create Ethics Headaches for DOJ Lawyers, 
REUTERS (June 7, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-ethics-idUSKBN18Y2SR; 
David G. Savage, Trump Undercuts His Lawyers with Tweets About Travel Ban, L.A. TIMES (June 5, 
2017, 7:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-court-tweets-20170605-story.html. 
 117. WENDEL, supra note 7 at 80–81. 
 118. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 
44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958). 
 119. Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 15311 (9th Cir. 1986), on denial 
of reh’g, 809 F.2d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing); 2 MALLEN 
& SMITH, supra note 114, § 19:12 (contrasting advocacy and advisory functions of lawyers). 
 120. See infra Part III.D. 
 121. Cf. Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Advisor and the Practice of the Rule of Law, 47 U.B.C. L. 
REV. 743 (2014) (arguing for a similar position, although based on a constructive normative 
interpretation of the Canadian law governing lawyers). 
 122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
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power of the judiciary to regulate the legal profession.123 But prior 
presidential administrations clashed with state courts over the 
preemption by federal regulations of state rules of professional 
conduct.124 In the George H.W. Bush Administration, Attorney General 
Richard Thornburgh took the position that federal prosecutors were 
exempt from state rules of professional conduct.125 Thornburgh 
contended that state courts had unnecessarily expanded state rules, 
particularly the prohibition on a lawyer directing communications with a 
target of an investigation known to be represented by counsel in the 
matter, and thus interfered with the mandate of law enforcement.126 
Thornburgh wanted blanket immunity from discipline for Justice 
Department lawyers. His position on behalf of the Justice Department 
was based in part on the Supremacy Clause, but also on the aggressive 
assertion of a categorical difference between federal lawyers and other 
lawyers, and between prosecutors and other lawyers. Thornburgh wrote 
that “the responsibility of federal attorneys engaged in law enforcement 
is simply different than other attorneys.’”127 This argument did not sit 
well with critics who foresaw a broader effort by the Bush Administration 
to exempt government lawyers from regulation by state courts.128 
The debate was finally resolved when Congress passed the McDade 
Amendment.129 Representative Joseph McDade (R-Pa.) got an up-close 
look at the power of federal prosecutors after being indicted on 
corruption charges, which cost him the chairmanship of the powerful 
House Appropriations Committee. He complained that federal 
investigators “harassed” and “hounded” him for the preceding 44 months 
and that they turned his life into “a living nightmare.”130 He filed 
numerous motions alleging prosecutorial misconduct, but they were all 
 
 123. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2.2 (1986). 
 124. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,  
88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?,  
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (1996); Todd S. Schulman, Wisdom Without Power: The Department of 
Justice’s Attempt to Exempt Federal Prosecutors from State No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 
(1996); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The 
Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 (1992). 
 125. See Memorandum from Richard L. Thornburgh Attorney Gen., to all Justice Dep’t Litigators 
(June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992); see also Dick 
Thornburgh, Ethics and the Attorney General: The Attorney General Responds, 74 JUDICATURE  
290 (1991) (defending the position in the memo). 
 126. Thornburgh, supra note 125, at 290–91. 
 127. Thornburgh, supra note 125, at 335. 
 128. See Jerry E. Norton, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74 JUDICATURE 203, 206–07 (1991). 
 129. See Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act and the Citizen’s Protection Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 113 Stat. 9, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1998); see also Ethical Standards for 
Attorneys for the Government, 28 C.F.R. § 77.1 (2005) (implementing regulations). 
 130. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Top Republican on a House Panel Is Charged with Accepting 
Bribes, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/06/us/top-republican-on-a-
house-panel-is-charged-with-accepting-bribes.html. 
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denied.131 After his acquittal,132 he spearheaded the passage of a statute 
to clarify, once and for all, the applicability of state rules of professional 
conduct to federal government employees. Federal legislation now 
provides that an attorney employed by the federal government “shall be 
subject to state laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing 
attorneys in each state where such attorney engages in that attorney’s 
duties, to the same extent as other attorneys in that state.”133 
With the passage of the McDade Amendment, it is now clear that 
state disciplinary authorities may proceed against lawyers employed by 
the federal government who are admitted in that state. Even if a state 
disciplinary authority does not pursue a grievance proceeding against a 
federal lawyer, the McDade Amendment still clarifies the legal norms 
regulating the conduct of government lawyers. The legal profession 
proudly claims to be largely self-regulating, and even if lawyers are 
actually subject to considerable external regulation,134 it is nevertheless a 
core commitment of the ideal of professionalism that lawyers should not 
need to be coerced into complying with their ethical responsibilities.135 
The under-enforcement of particular norms, or the reluctance of state 
disciplinary authorities to pursue cases against particular types of 
lawyers (for example, big-firm or government), does not alter the 
significance of the underlying standards of conduct. It is now clear that 
those standards are given by state rules of professional conduct. 
C. CLIENT IDENTIFICATION FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS¾MODEL  
RULE 1.13 
Questions concerning the relationship between the legal profession 
and the rule of law presuppose a lawyer-client relationship. The most 
basic statement of lawyers’ duties under agency and tort law is that they 
must seek to advance their clients’ lawful ends, as defined by the client 
after consultation.136 It is for the client to determine the objectives of the 
representation.137 Therefore, a lawyer without a client is almost a 
 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 28 F.3d 283 (3d 
Cir. 1994); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL 382351, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1992); 
United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL 187036, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992). 
 132. See Eric Pianin, Rep. McDade Acquitted of Bribery, Racketeering Charges, WASH. POST (Aug. 
2, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/02/rep-mcdade-acquitted-of-
bribery-racketeering-charges/07af5f6a-330e-496c-9025-c059ab1f5f85/?utm_term=.7f37aa552e3a. 
 133. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2010). 
 134. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
 135. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
16–17 (2000). 
 136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). This is an important  
anti-paternalist aspect of the ethics of a lawyer’s role. See, e.g., David Luban, Paternalism and the 
Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454 (1981); Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in 
Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103 (2010). 
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contradiction in terms. Some of the biggest messes in the regulation of 
lawyers arise in the context of the representation of organizational 
clients, where lines of authority are unclear and the usual lawyer-over-
client hierarchy of control is destabilized.138 The situation is, if anything, 
more muddled in the case of lawyers working for the government.139 
While erroneous client identification can subject private lawyers to 
sanctions,140 for government lawyers it can throw off the whole analysis 
of their ethical obligations.141 
Consider the argument, frequently encountered, that the client of a 
government attorney is not a particular official or government agency, 
but “the American public and its collective interests and values.”142 This 
 
 138. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or 
Law, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 177, 183–85 (Deborah L. Rhode, ed., 2000); see also Robert P. Lawry, 
Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REV. 625 (1979) (arguing that the former Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility did not deal well with situations in which the lawyer’s client is not 
a readily identifiable human being). 
 139. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Representation of Public Agencies 
in Civil Matters, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 211 (2000); James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government 
Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569 
(1996); Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government 
Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (1991); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and 
the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.  
951 (1991); William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the 
Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539 (1986). The Model Rules contain a 
Rule specifying the duties owed by a lawyer for an organization; here, the relevant provision is that the 
lawyer represents the organization itself, acting through duly authorized constituents. See PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.13(a). One thing that is clear from this rule is that a lawyer representing a government 
organization does not represent any individual officers or government employees, but instead owes 
her duties of loyalty and confidentiality to the organization itself. See, e.g., Salt Lake Cty. Comm’n v. 
Salt Lake Cty. Attorney, 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999); Gray v. Rhode Island Dep’t of Children, Youth and 
Families, 937 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1996). What is less clear is the identity of “the organization” in the 
context of government service. A comment to the Rule unhelpfully states that, “[a]lthough in some 
circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the 
executive branch, or the government as a whole.” PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13, cmt. 9. Accordingly, as 
discussed in text, infra notes 145-49, and accompanying text, it is necessary to clarify the purpose for 
which one is asking the client-identity question. The answer may differ, depending on whether the 
legal issue pertains to confidentiality, conflicts of interest, or the duty to provide independent advice. 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d on other 
grounds sub. nom., United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 141. The District of Columbia Bar considered a revision to the Model Rules to recognize distinctive 
ethical obligations for government lawyers. See REPORT BY THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in 
WASH. LAW. 53 (Sept./Oct. 1988). The D.C. Bar Committee rightly observed that important 
conclusions about lawyers’ obligations follow from the identity of the client, including some conflict of 
interest issues, the appropriateness of disclosing confidential information, and the amount of 
discretion a lawyer can exercise in the course of the representation. Id. at 54. 
 142. Richard B. Bilder & Detlev Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, in THE 
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 153 (Karen Greenberg ed., 2006); see also William R. Dailey, CSC, Who 
is the Attorney General’s Client?, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113 (2012) (arguing that the client of the 
Attorney General is the American people, as mediated by the President and Congress); Griffin B. Bell, 
The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among 
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may be merely a metaphor, in which case no harm is done as long as the 
lawyer understands that it falls to some particular government official or 
agency to determine the content of the public interest on the matter in 
question.143 And it is true, as noted above, that prosecutors have a diverse 
constituency, the interests of which they must reconcile in deciding how 
to proceed on behalf of the government. But if the argument is 
understood literally in other contexts, a government lawyer may be 
misled into believing that certain legal permissions and obligations 
follow. For example, if the lawyer’s client is the American public and a 
government official is engaged in conduct that the lawyer believes to be 
contrary to the public interest, then should the lawyer be permitted to 
inform her “real” client, the public? Some scholars have taken the 
position that a lawyer should not regard a government agency as having 
the same interest in confidentiality as a private client does, because the 
public interest in disclosure is the interest of the lawyer’s client.144 Or, if 
the lawyer’s client is the American public or some reified conception of 
the public interest, then the lawyer should not simply follow the lawful 
instructions of an authorized government official, but should make an 
independent determination of whether the official’s instructions are in 
the public interest.145 This approach to the allocation of decision-making 
authority shifts power from the client to the lawyer to determine both the 
ends of the representation and the means by which it will be carried 
out.146 
As these considerations suggest, lawyers should ask the client 
identification question because they are interested in determining what 
obligations they owe.147 If the issue is the duty of loyalty, for example, as 
it might come up in a motion to disqualify for conflicts of interest, then 
the client identity issue may be resolved by considering the interests that 
any client would have in the loyalty of a lawyer and determining which 
government officials or agencies have that interest. Conflicts of interest 
cases involve not only client identity, but consideration of the scope of 
duties owed to any would-be client. Consider a well-known conflicts case 
 
Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1069 (1978) (“Although our client is the government, in the end we 
serve a more important constituency: the American people.”). 
 143. See Miller, supra note 15. 
 144. See, e.g., James E. Moliterno, The Federal Government Lawyer’s Duty to Breach 
Confidentiality, 14 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 633, 634–35 (2005) (arguing that “the government 
lawyer works for a public-abiding client, one that would expect disclosure of internal government 
wrongdoing”). 
 145. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will 
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2000). 
 146. Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the Ethics of the President’s Lawyers, 61 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 77 (1998). 
 147. Robert P. Lawry, Who Is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of the 
Wrong Question, 37 FED. B.J. 61 (1978). 
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arising out of the representation of a government client.148 In that case, 
Covington & Burling represented a tobacco company, Brown & 
Williamson, in a challenge to New York State’s ban on direct-mail sales 
of cigarettes. After the firm noticed the deposition of two attorneys in the 
state attorney general’s office, the attorney general moved to disqualify 
the firm on the ground that it had represented various state agencies for 
over twenty-five years on matters relating to the state’s public assistance 
programs, and argued that the entire executive branch of the state 
government was the firm’s client.149 
Conflict of interest rules, in general, protect the client’s reasonable 
expectation of its lawyer’s undivided loyalty. Would it be disloyal for 
Covington to help a client sell more cigarettes in New York while 
simultaneously advising the state on Medicare, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families, and other federally-funded public-welfare programs? 
One could certainly imagine an individual client caring about the health 
and well-being of low-income New Yorkers and thus being appalled at 
the thought of making it easier for these same citizens to purchase 
tobacco products. It may be, however, that a government client has a 
different, and equally reasonable expectation of loyalty. “Among the 
myriad State interests,” the court observed, “it may be the case that those 
implicated by C&B’s representation are relatively narrow.”150 Thus the 
district court, after cautioning that the client-identification issue could 
not be approached formalistically, looked to the factors that often 
underlie motions to disqualify for conflicts of interest, including whether 
it is likely that the vigor of the firm’s representation of the moving party 
would be diminished by the other client relationship, and whether it 
could acquire confidential information in one representation that could 
be used against the other client in the second representation.151 Using this 
approach, the court concluded that the firm’s government client was the 
specific agency responsible for the public-assistance programs, not the 
state or the executive branch as a whole. 
The Restatement also takes this position, as noted above. A 
government lawyer’s client is generally the represented agency, 
exercising its authority through officers authorized to make decisions on 
behalf of the agency.152 (A government official may seek representation 
in his or her individual capacity, but the Restatement rule is the default.) 
Maintaining that the client of a government lawyer is “the people” or “the 
public interest” effectively shifts power to the lawyer to make decisions 
about what is in the public interest, but of course this is exactly what 
 
 148. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Pataki, 152 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 149. Id. at 280–81, 286. 
 150. Id. at 285. 
 151. Id. at 286, 288. 
 152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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elections are for. No matter how sincere or strongly held, a lawyer’s belief 
about the content of the public interest is just that: a belief.153 
Unfortunately, the Restatement approach does not entirely solve the 
agency problem arising from potential divergence between the lawyer’s 
view of the interests of a represented agency and the views of its 
incumbent agency head. Consider the White House Counsel’s Office 
which, by tradition represents the office of the President, not necessarily 
the interests of the specific President currently serving in office.154 A 
lawyer serving in that office must be attentive to the long-range interests 
of the Presidency, the independence, and have the fortitude to resist 
demands by the current President that may be contrary to these longer-
term interests. Of course, the incumbent President may see this kind of 
resistance as disloyal. Certainly President Trump, who is reportedly 
obsessed with the loyalty of his subordinates,155 would be unlikely to take 
it very well if his White House Counsel advised him that a proposed 
action was contrary to the interests of the office of the President. 
Evidence for this proposition comes from Trump’s anger at Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions for recusing himself from the investigation of 
Russian interference with the election.156 This may be referred to as an 
apparent agency problem, because what the President perceives as 
disloyal may in fact be respect for the obligations of White House 
 
 153. See Miller, supra note 15, at 1294–95. This argument should not be taken as a decisive 
objection to the conception of legal advising that requires government lawyers to provide their best 
view of the law, as distinguished from a view that comports with the President’s policy objectives and 
would not subject a lawyer to sanctions if offered as a legal argument in a litigated matter. The views 
of some lawyers, particularly those in the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) are effectively conclusive for 
the purpose of establishing the legality of some government action. By the Spider-Man principle, with 
the great power to establish a conclusive position on the lawfulness of some course of conduct comes 
the great responsibility to get the law right. See Moss, supra note 17, at 1317–18. Note, however, that 
the client receiving advice that represents the lawyers’ best view of the law is the President, not some 
reified conception of the public interest. 
 154. The Lawfare Podcast: Bob Bauer on Trump and the White House Counsel, LAWFARE (May 
27, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-bob-bauer-trump-and-white-
house-counsel (interview with former White House Counsel). 
 155. See Michael Gerson, Opinion, The Trump-Comey Contest Is a Titanic Clash of Worldviews, 
WASH. POST (June 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-trump-comey-contest-
is-a-titanic-clash-of-worldviews/2017/06/08/0f622d68-4c91-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html. 
(“Trump lives for loyalty but seems incapable of showing it. He demands sycophancy and yet, driven 
by his own obsessions and disorders, he regularly exposes his closest aides to public ridicule and 
humiliation.”). 
 156. See Abby Phillip & Sari Horwitz, Trump Blasts AG Sessions for Recusing Himself from the 
Russia Probe, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-politics/wp/2017/07/19/trump-blasts-ag-sessions-for-recusing-himself-from-the-russia-probe. 
In testimony before a Senate committee, Sessions stated that recusal was required under a Justice 
Department regulation. See Kurtis Lee, Sessions Cites Justice Department Regulation in Recusal from 
Russia Inquiry, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2017, 12:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/ 
washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-sessions-cites-department-of-justice-1497381828-
htmlstory.html. 
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Counsel. The important point to see here is that this principle of client 
identification is not formalistic, but supports an allocation of power to 
make decisions on behalf of the government, and ultimately on behalf of 
all citizens subject to the decisions of democratically elected officials. A 
government lawyer is the agent of the citizens of the nation, and stands 
in a co-agency relationship with the elected officials who may think of 
themselves (wrongly) as the client of the lawyer. This position is not a 
special feature of the role of government legal advisor. Any lawyer stands 
in a principal-agent relationship with her client, where one of the signal 
characteristics is the authority of the principal to make decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation.157 Corporate lawyers, 
similarly, are co-agents with the officers of the corporation of the 
organization and ultimately of its shareholders.158 What William Simon 
terms the “Managerialist Fallacy” is the conflation of the interests of 
corporate management and the organization itself.159 Government 
lawyers engage in similarly fallacious reasoning when they defer to the 
interests of individual government officials, rather than acting in the best 
interests of the agency or the executive branch itself. 
In short, the role of lawyers as fiduciaries is a feature of professional 
ethics that cuts across the government/private client distinction. It may 
also have constitutional significance,160 but it is fundamental to the 
normative structure of the attorney’s role that she serve a client who has 
the authority to make decisions regarding the objectives of the 
representation. 
D. INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 
  Rule 2.1 provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, 
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client’s situation.161 
There is a lot going on in this little rule. It encompasses duties of 
competence, communication, honesty, and fidelity to law under the 
rubric of candid, independent advice. The rule clearly embodies the 
agency and fiduciary nature of the lawyer’s role. The lawyer’s ethical 
obligation is to honestly inform clients of the legal and non-legal 
 
 157. See LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 21(1), (2) (defining scope of client’s presumptive authority). 
 158. See William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS  
489, 494, 496–97 (2016). 
 159. Id. at 497. 
 160. See Miller, supra note 15, at 1295 (“[T]he idea that government attorneys serve some higher 
purpose fails to place the attorney within a structure of democratic government.”). 
 161. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
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consequences of their proposed course of action so that the client can 
make an autonomous decision.162 Rule 2.1 therefore reinforces the 
allocation of decisionmaking authority between lawyers and clients, 
while also supporting the lawyer’s duty to ensure the client’s compliance 
with law.163 
The duty to render independent, candid legal advice was at the 
center of a five-year investigation by the Department of Justice Office of 
Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) of high-level Department lawyers.164 
The story leading up to the investigation is familiar: In the months after 
the 9/11 attacks, American special forces, CIA, and allied military and 
intelligence officers captured several suspected high-level al-Qaeda 
terrorists, who were believed to have information about imminent 
operations aimed at American targets.165 How much force could be used 
to extract information from such a captive? Senior political officials, most 
prominently Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, were pushing hard for legal authorization to employ a 
range of techniques, many, long been recognized under international and 
domestic law as torture, to pry information out of suspected terrorists.166 
Farther down the chain of command, however, military and intelligence 
officers wanted legal cover.167 Numerous meetings and brainstorming 
sessions already occurred, in which political officials from defense, 
intelligence, and national security agencies, along with representatives of 
the uniformed services, consulted with their respective lawyers about the 
permissibility of using so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques.”168 
The attitude consistently conveyed from the top was that “[t]he President 
 
 162. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some 
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986). 
 163. The Supreme Court stated, in frequently cited dicta in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S.  
383, 389 (1981), that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to allow a free flow of confidential 
communications between attorney and client so that the attorney can learn all the relevant facts and 
then provide advice to the client on how to comply with the law. 
 164. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25; see also Milan Markovic, Advising Clients After Critical 
Legal Studies and the Torture Memos, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 124–32 (2011) (providing overview of 
the controversy over the Yoo and Bybee memos). 
 165. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 24, at 139–81 (describing capture and torture of Abu Zubayda, 
as well as the deliberation surrounding legality of interrogation techniques). 
 166. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 67–70; MAYER, supra note 24, at 143–45; SANDS, supra note 
24, at 20–21, 32–36, 44–48; see also Heather MacDonald, How to Interrogate Terrorists, in THE 
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 84 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006) (noting that Kandahar detainees had 
studied American interrogation techniques and had received resistance training). 
 167. See, e.g., SANDS, supra note 24, at 48 (reporting that Major General Michael Dunlavey, the 
commanding officer of the interrogation unit at Guantánamo Bay, said: “I wanted legal sign-off, I 
wanted accountability, I wanted top cover.”). 
 168. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 24, at 219–24 (describing paper trail of documents reflecting 
legal opinions from Donald Rumsfeld’s counsel, Jim Haynes, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, 
and counsel to the Vice President David Addington); SANDS, supra note 24, at 60–66; GOLDSMITH, 
supra note 11, at 108–20; BRUFF, supra note 18, at 235–40, 273–76. 
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had to do what he had to do to protect the country[,] [a]nd the lawyers 
had to find some way to make what he did legal.”169 The linchpin in the 
legal authorization for the use of techniques such as waterboarding, sleep 
deprivation, extreme cold temperatures, stress positions, sexually and 
religiously oriented humiliation, and harsh lights and sound, was advice 
provided by two lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel, John Yoo and Jay 
Bybee.170 
Yoo and Bybee gave a great deal of advice to the administration 
concerning aspects of the government’s response to the terrorist threat, 
but the OPR Report focused most of its analysis on a memo dealing with 
the legality of interrogation techniques to be used on captured al-Qaeda 
operatives.171 The memo reached a number of legal conclusions that 
astonished commentators when the advice became public: (1) under the 
statute criminalizing torture, implementing the obligation of the United 
States under the Convention Against Torture,172 an actor must have the 
specific intent to inflict severe pain, and this means that causing severe 
pain is the actor’s express purpose;173 (2) the level of pain necessary to 
satisfy this requirement is that “associated with a sufficiently serious 
physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious 
impairment of body functions”;174 (3) that the infliction of mental harm 
violates the statute only if it is “lasting, though not necessarily 
permanent,” such as post-traumatic stress disorder or chronic 
depression;175 (4) the defenses of necessity and self-defense are available 
to a prosecution under the statute;176 and (5) even if the statute 
prohibited a method of interrogation and there was no statutory defense, 
 
 169. GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 81. 
 170. Id. at 142–52. For descriptions of the treatment of detainees including Abu Zubaydah, Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”), and Mohammed al-Qahtani, see MAYER, supra note 24, at 272–77; 
SANDS, supra note 24, at 4–5, 11–13, 23–24, 156–62; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 83–90; David 
W. Bowker, Unwise Counsel: The War on Terrorism and the Criminal Mistreatment of Detainees in 
U.S. Custody, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 194 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006) (citing an 
official U.S. Army report, which described torture techniques). 
 171. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE 
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua Dratel. eds., 2005); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 25, at 67–69, 77–81 (describing the drafting history of Bybee and Yoo memos). 
 172. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2012); G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984). 
 173. Aug. 1, 2002, Memorandum, supra note 171, at 175. See Oona Hathaway et al., Tortured 
Reasoning: The Intent to Torture Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791,  
809–22 (2012) (criticizing this reasoning as inconsistent with domestic and international criminal 
law); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 130, 168 (reporting OLC attorney Dan Levin’s disbelief “that 
if I hit you on the head with a . . . hammer, even though I know it’s going to cause specific pain, if the 
reason I’m doing it is to get you to talk rather than to cause pain, I’m not violating the statute.”). 
 174. Memorandum, supra note 171, at 176. 
 175. Id. at 177. 
 176. Id. at 207–13. 
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application of the statute to prohibit interrogation techniques ordered by 
the President would be unconstitutional because it “impermissibly 
encroache[s] on the President’s constitutional power to conduct a 
military campaign.”177 The reasoning in the memos was subjected to 
severe criticism after it was revealed,178 and OLC subsequently disavowed 
much of it.179 
The OPR Report concluded that Yoo and Bybee committed 
professional misconduct by violating their duty to “exercise independent 
legal judgment and render thorough, objective, and candid legal 
advice.”180 It painstakingly analyzed the legal advice provided, the 
arguments in support, and the lawyers’ treatment of adverse authority 
and counterarguments. The Report is noteworthy in several respects. 
First, as it should, the Report did not dwell on whether the lawyers 
reached the right answer, and did not hold against Yoo and Bybee that 
other lawyers disagreed with them.181 Lawyers would undoubtedly be 
cautious about giving advice to a client if they believed they would be 
disciplined after the fact merely because other lawyers had a different 
view of the correct result.182 The Report accordingly disclaimed any 
intent to punish lawyers who found themselves on one side of a 
reasonable disagreement. Second, the Report did not proceed from the 
assumption that there are clear right and wrong answers to legal 
questions. The duty to give candid, independent legal advice does not 
require lawyers to hit the target, in the sense of giving the right answer. 
Instead, the Report examined the OLC lawyers’ process of arriving at 
 
 177. Id. at 200. 
 178. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1694–1709 (2005), reprinted in TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS: 
PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE (2010); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the 
Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2006); Jens D. Ohlin, The 
Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193, 199–207 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, On “Waterboarding”: 
Legal Interpretation and the Continuing Struggle for Human Rights, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 269, 
283–86 (2008); Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1150 
(2006) (noting that the memos blessed the use of techniques that had been employed by Saddam 
Hussein); George C. Harris, The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional 
Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409,  
431–41 (2005). 
 179. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of Assistant Attorney Gen. 2 (Dec. 30, 2004) 
(disavowing and replacing memos drafted by Yoo and Bybee); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 
25, at 117–21 (summarizing Jack Goldsmith’s criticism of reasoning in Yoo and Bybee memos); id. at 
130 (setting out Dan Levin’s criticism of commander-in-chief, specific intent, and severe pain and 
suffering analysis). 
 180. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 11. The lawyers were treated differently on the basis of 
their mens rea. The Report found that Yoo committed intentional professional misconduct, while 
Bybee acted in reckless disregard of his obligations. Id. 
 181. Id. at 160. 
 182. See, e.g., Julian Ku, The Wrongheaded and Dangerous Campaign to Criminalize Good Faith 
Legal Advice, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 449, 456–57 (2009). 
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legal conclusions. In other words, it focuses not on advice but on 
advising. At times, for example, Yoo appeared to conduct only cursory 
research.183 The memos sometimes failed to cite and discuss contrary 
authority, even as obviously relevant as the Steel Seizure Case, the 
leading Supreme Court precedent on the relationship between the 
Executive Branch and Congress in wartime.184 The analysis of complex, 
subtle issues was frequently oversimplified, sometimes to the point of 
being misleading,185 and often failed to acknowledge ambiguities, 
limitations, or counterarguments.186 The authors of the memos 
paraphrased statutory language (a no-no, as we teach our law students in 
statutory interpretation classes) in a way that slanted the analysis toward 
their preferred conclusion,187 mischaracterized the holdings of cases and 
the significance of other authority,188 and blended the elements of legal 
doctrines in a way that obscured the significance of certain facts.189 
 
 183. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 166 (reporting that Yoo had stated in interviews that, 
regarding the specific-intent analysis, he had only “looked at cases quickly,” was working from a 
recollection of a law review or treatise, and got the impression from talking with criminal law 
specialists that it was a “we-know-it-when-we-see-it” standard); id. at 209 (citing Yoo’s statement that 
he was unfamiliar with the necessity defense in criminal law and noting that he missed relevant 
authority from every federal circuit). 
 184. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 204 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952)); see also id. at 207–09 (noting that the discussion of the necessity defense failed to 
discuss two leading Supreme Court cases); id. at 235 (criticizing memos for not mentioning that a 
federal district court had found waterboarding to be torture in litigation against former Philippine 
President Ferdinand Marcos, and that the Justice Department had charged a Texas sheriff with civil 
rights violations for using waterboarding on criminal suspects to coerce confessions). 
 185. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 168–73 (noting, among other deficiencies, that Bybee had 
read a Supreme Court case dealing with the element of willfulness as bearing on the proper 
understanding of specific intent); id. at 184–86 (criticizing memo for oversimplifying ratification 
history of Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)); id. at 217–19 (similarly criticizing authors for citing 
Reagan Administration reservation to the CAT regarding common-law defenses such as necessity, but 
not mentioning subsequent reversal of that position by Bush Administration). The Report 
acknowledged that an attorney may advance a position that extends existing law to novel situations; 
when doing so, however, it is a violation of professional standards to fail to point out that the position 
is novel and not supported by existing law, and to omit to raise counterarguments. Id. at 230–31. 
 186. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 174–75, 174 n.131 (observing that Bybee memo failed to 
mention that good faith defense developed in the context of tax and financial crimes, may not apply in 
the same manner to a mala in se crime like torture, and in any event may be limited by willful 
blindness); id. at 181 n.135 (criticizing authors for not acknowledging that “severe pain” was given 
inconsistent definitions in statutes); id. at 201–03 (noting that analysis of Commander-in-Chief power 
did not acknowledge the limitation as applied to such as basic norm as the prohibition on torture). 
 187. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 178 (discussing use of medical-benefits statute to define 
severe pain, and paraphrases such as “serious dysfunction of any bodily organ” becoming “organ 
failure”). 
 188. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 187–90 (criticizing memos for characterizing cases 
decided under the Torture Victims Protection Act as involving only conduct that is particularly cruel 
and sadistic); id. at 221–23 (noting that memo cited a law review article by a philosopher as a leading 
authority on the law of self-defense, when in fact the article did not discuss American caselaw and was 
based on hypotheticals and moral arguments). 
 189. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 210–14 (showing how, regarding the necessity defense, 
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Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis reversed the 
OPR Report’s conclusions based on the question of whether the sloppy, 
cavalier analysis displayed by Yoo and Bybee rose to the level of a 
violation of governing legal standards.190 The OPR’s Analytical 
Framework states that a Justice Department attorney “engages in 
professional misconduct when he or she intentionally violates or acts in 
reckless disregard of an obligation or standard imposed by law [or] 
applicable rule of professional conduct . . . .”191 Instead, Margolis seemed 
to focus on whether there was a single, specific bar rule that proscribes 
the lawyers’ conduct.192 He appears to assign a great deal of weight to the 
fact that Rule 2.1 almost never serves as the sole basis for discipline in 
grievance proceedings against lawyers: 
OPR has not cited, and I have not located, any case in any jurisdiction 
that reaches a finding of a violation of Rule 2.1 where an attorney 
provided the client advice free of any discernable conflict or in which a 
court considered an alleged violation of Rule 2.1 that was not collateral 
to violations of other Rules of Conduct.193 
It is true that there are few, if any, grievance proceedings based only 
on Rule 2.1 allegations. That does not mean that Rule 2.1 is an empty rule, 
only that the type of conduct that would constitute an un-aggravated Rule 
2.1 violation in the context of private-client representation would 
ordinarily be addressed by an action for malpractice or breach of 
fiduciary duty brought by the client. A rule of professional conduct may 
state a genuine duty even if state bar grievance committees generally do 
not perform much of an enforcement rule. Simple negligence claims, for 
example, may result in professional discipline under Rule 1.1,194 but state 
regulators tend to punt responsibility for enforcing standards of 
competent representation to the civil litigation system.195 In the context 
of government-agency representation, there are doctrinal reasons, 
including qualified immunity, why successful malpractice actions are 
 
the memos’ summary of the doctrine overlooked the importance of considerations such as the 
availability of alternatives to violating the law and the imminence of the threat to the actor). 
 190. See Markovic, supra note 164, at 132–37. 
 191. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 2 
(2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opr/legacy/2006/03/15/framework.pdf. The 
OPR Analytical Framework has a comprehensive list of sources of legal obligations for Justice 
Department attorneys, including the Constitution, federal statutes and case law, court orders and rules 
of procedure, and the rules of professional conduct of an attorney’s admitting jurisdiction and any 
jurisdiction in which the attorney is litigating. See id. 
 192. Margolis, supra note 26, at 12. 
 193. Id. at 24. 
 194. See ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 20–27 (7th 
ed. 2011). 
 195. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Neale, 384 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1980) (suggesting that professional 
discipline should not be used “as a substitute for what is essentially a malpractice action”); Susan R. 
Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO. L.J. 705 (1981). 
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uncommon.196 Although one might therefore expect state regulators to 
pick up the slack, a grievance proceeding generally requires a grievant. 
Government agencies, however, may be reluctant to file professional 
disciplinary charges against their lawyers, preferring to deal with the 
matter internally, through discipline or termination. 
The Margolis Memo did not say that lawyers have no ethical 
constraints when serving as advisors. It recognized, as an unambiguous 
obligation, that lawyers may not “provide advice to their client that was 
knowingly or recklessly false or issued in bad faith.”197 It arrived at this 
subjective standard by reading a number of rules together (as it should): 
District of Columbia Rule 2.1 on independent judgment, Rule 1.2(d) 
prohibiting knowingly providing assistance to a client’s criminal or 
fraudulent conduct, Rule 3.3’s requirement of candor to the tribunal, and 
the prohibition in Rule 8.4(c) on conduct involving dishonesty. Each of 
these rules, either on their face or as interpreted in bar disciplinary 
proceedings, has a mens rea standard of either knowledge or 
recklessness. Therefore, the content of the minimal obligation of 
government lawyers serving in an advisory role is to refrain from giving 
advice that the lawyers believe to be incorrect. The problem with this 
approach is that it is highly selective, relied on rules that do not apply to 
lawyers as advisors, and ignores other aspects of the law governing 
lawyers that would support an objective standard of reasonableness. In 
particular, the reliance on Rule 3.3 is bizarre. That rule deals with the 
introduction of false factual testimony or evidence, and reflects the 
division of labor among advocates and the court in a litigated matter. 
There has been a decades-long and colorful controversy surrounding the 
problem of client perjury, particularly in criminal defense cases,198 and 
much of the current debate in the cases centers on the mens rea 
 
 196. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 114, § 24:15. In the context of private client representation, 
the in pari delicto defense prevents a client who knowingly engaged in wrongdoing from recovering 
from a lawyer who advised the client. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS  
§ 54, cmt. F (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 197. Margolis, supra note 26, at 26; see also Markovic, supra note 164, at 134–35 (reading the 
Margolis in the same way). 
 198. Monroe Freedman argued, in one of the best-known articles in professional responsibility 
literature, that a criminal defense attorney must strike the appropriate balance among three 
duties¾competent representation, confidentiality, and candor to the tribunal. In some situations, 
there will be no way to satisfy all three of these obligations, so something has got to give. The only 
question is what. When confronted by a client who intends to take the stand and tell a lie, Freedman 
argued that candor to the tribunal ought to be subordinated to the constitutionally-protected duty of 
providing effective assistance of counsel, including a stringent obligation of confidentiality. See 
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three 
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474–78 (1966). This stance was so shocking to 
professional sensibilities at the time that three federal judges filed a disciplinary grievance against 
Freedman for merely advocating the priority of loyal client service over candor to the tribunal.  
See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 133 n.1, 
136–38 (2008) (retelling this story). 
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requirement¾when will a lawyer have sufficient knowledge of the falsity 
of the client’s story that taking remedial measures is required?199 The 
perjury rule sheds no light whatsoever on the stance a lawyer ought to 
take toward the law, not facts, when serving as an advisor, not an 
advocate in litigation. 
Margolis did not endorse the position urged by John Yoo’s defense 
counsel, who claimed that a lawyer can never be subject to discipline for 
advising a client that the law conforms to the lawyer’s own beliefs, no 
matter how idiosyncratic. Yoo quotes other OLC lawyers who report that 
he had maintained an aggressive view about the proper scope of 
presidential power long before being appointed to OLC.200 Yoo’s  
well-known hawkish views were undoubtedly one of the reasons for his 
appointed to the Bush Administration’s OLC, but they had no bearing on 
his ethical obligations once appointed. More relevant is a key theme in 
the law of lawyering¾that a lawyer owes a client an objective standard of 
reasonable competence in the representation. This obligation is clearly 
established as a matter of constitutional and tort law,201 and robust 
across many contexts, including transactional advising, negotiation, 
settlement, and counseling,202 as well as advocacy in litigation. The 
principle that lawyers are not liable for errors of judgment when 
reasonable lawyers could disagree is correct as far as it goes, but it is 
important to understand that it is limited by the lawyer’s obligation to 
conduct a reasonable investigation of both facts and law before making a 
judgment call; a lawyer may be liable for an erroneous judgment if it is 
unreasonable under the circumstances.203 A client is entitled to an 
informed judgment, and also to accurate information about the state of 
the law. If the law is uncertain on some point, a lawyer must, consistent 
with fiduciary duties of competence and communication, advise the 
client about unsettled issues of law, although the lawyer will not be liable 
for failing to predict an eventual judicial resolution.204 And while lawyers 
 
 199. See, e.g., People v. Andrades, 828 N.E.2d 599 (N.Y. 2005); State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 
500, 513 (Wis. 2004); United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2003); United States  
v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 200. See Classified Response to the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional 
Responsibility Classified Report Dated July 29, 2009, Submitted on Behalf of Professor John C. Yoo 
(Oct. 9, 2009).  
 201. See, e.g., 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 114, § 20:3 (explaining that the standard of care for 
attorneys is the skill and judgment of a reasonable member of the profession); Strickland  
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment standard of effective 
assistance of counsel requires reasonableness under prevailing professional norms). 
 202. See, e.g., Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046 (Cal. 2003); Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799,  
806 (Mass. 1996). 
 203. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 114, §§ 19:1, 19:13; Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298 (N.J. 
1992). The same principle applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Sixth 
Amendment. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 204. See, e.g., Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Neb. 1999). 
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may be disciplined for introducing false factual evidence only when they 
have actual knowledge of its falsity, the standard for sanctioning lawyers 
who make inadequately supported legal arguments is well-established as 
an objective one¾there is no “pure heart, empty head” defense for a 
lawyer who sincerely believes his view of the law is right, against what a 
hypothetical reasonable lawyer would understand as the weight of 
authority.205 Nothing in the Margolis Memo should be understood as 
establishing a standard that differs from these fundamental principles. 
Bruce Ackerman argues that Margolis “completely exonerates” Yoo 
and Bybee of misconduct and, as a result, makes it more likely that 
government lawyers in the future will agree to bless an unlawful course 
of conduct.206 Similarly, in an acerbic on-line reaction to the Margolis 
Memo, Jack Balkin reads it as an example of lawyers protecting their 
own: 
[T]he standard for attorney misconduct is set pretty damn low, and is 
only violated by lawyers who . . . are the scum of the earth. . . . [Rules 
of professional conduct] are set up by jurisdictions to weed out the 
worst offenders, leaving the rest of the legal profession to make entirely 
stupid, disingenuous and asinine arguments that normal people with 
functioning moral consciences would not make. . . . In effect, by setting 
the standard of conduct so low, rules of professional conduct effectively 
work to protect all those lawyers out there whose moral standing is just 
a hair’s breadth about your average mass murderer. This is how the 
American legal profession simultaneously polices and takes care of its 
own.207 
I share Ackerman’s and Balkin’s frustration that Yoo and Bybee 
escaped professional discipline for their central role in what even the 
Margolis Memo characterized as “an unfortunate chapter in the history 
of the Office of Legal Counsel.”208 But there are three points to make in 
the closing of this discussion. First, every government lawyer should 
pause and reflect that the Margolis Memo found it to be a “close question” 
whether “Yoo intentionally or recklessly provided misleading advice to 
his client,”209 even given the exigent circumstances at the time. Consider 
the background of enormous political pressure and the general sense of 
dread pervading the government after 9/11. According to Jack 
Goldsmith, David Addington declared that if lawyers did not give their 
blessing to the administration’s counterterrorism initiatives, “the blood 
 
 205. See, e.g., Balthazar v. Atlantic City Med. Ctr., 279 F. Supp. 2d 574, 593 (D.N.J. 2003); 
Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986); Golden Eagle Dist. Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,  
801 F.2d 1531, 1536–38 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 206. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 108 (2010). 
 207. Jack Balkin, Justice Department Will Not Punish Yoo and Bybee Because Most Lawyers Are 
Scum Anyway, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 19, 2010, 7:45 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2010/02/justice-department-will-not-punish-yoo.html. 
 208. Margolis, supra note 26, at 67. 
 209. Id. 
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of the hundred thousand people who die[d] in the next attack [would 
have been] on” their hands.210 The Margolis Memo notes on several 
occasions that the situation facing government officials and their legal 
advisors was at least perceived to be unprecedented in American history; 
the Memo is pervaded by phrases like “national security crisis” and 
“context of threat and danger.”211 Even so, Margolis clearly regretted the 
quality of the legal analysis provided by Yoo and Bybee and, at least if his 
own words are to be believed, came close to referring them to state bars 
for discipline. The unequivocal statements by Trump’s nominees for 
Attorney General and CIA Director that waterboarding is illegal may also 
evidence a certain recognition in official Washington circles that the Bush 
Administration pushed its lawyers too far to sign off on illegal conduct.212 
Second, if the Margolis Memo’s reversal of the Office of Professional 
Responsibility Report is simply realpolitik—lawyers protecting their 
own—then it does not furnish a principled basis for objecting to 
discipline in a case in which lawyers do much the same thing. Maybe 
Margolis felt a sense of loyalty to other Justice Department lawyers who 
lobbied against discipline for Yoo and Bybee, citing the extraordinary 
circumstances of ongoing credible threats of imminent attacks. Lawyers 
in a Trump Justice Department had better assure themselves of similarly 
well-connected allies. Perhaps the lawyers deserve a pass since everyone 
in the government was terrified of future attacks. But for a future 
administration, if the issue is objective compliance with ethical norms, 
then the torture memos provide a clear instance of violation of the duty 
of providing competent, independent, and candid advice. 
Third, and related to the potential future differences in political 
climate, the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility 
may find professional misconduct when a lawyer “intentionally violates 
or acts in reckless disregard of an obligation or standard imposed by [i] 
law, [ii] applicable rule of professional conduct, or [iii] Department 
regulation or policy.”213 Rules of professional conduct are law, in the 
sense that they are promulgated by state courts and enforced through 
professional disciplinary proceedings, so the disjunctive reference to law 
or rules of professional conduct must contemplate discipline for lawyers 
who violate norms of conduct not necessarily covered specifically by the 
rules. An intentional or reckless breach of fiduciary duty and the duty of 
reasonable care that rises to the level of aiding and abetting unlawful 
conduct by the client would satisfy the government’s own internal ethical 
standards, even if it would not subject a lawyer to discipline in his or her 
admitting state. 
 
 210. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 71. 
 211. Margolis, supra note 26, at 2, 16–17, 19–21. 
 212. See Apuzzo & Risen, supra note 65. 
 213. OPR ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 191 (emphasis added). 
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E. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND WHISTLEBLOWING 
Whistleblowing¾the disclosure of what would otherwise be 
protected confidential information with the aim of disclosing 
wrongdoing¾is a time-honored tactic employed against the abuse of 
government power. Consider the disclosure by Daniel Ellsberg of the  
so-called Pentagon Papers during the Vietnam War, revealing secret 
bombing campaigns in Laos and Cambodia. In a landmark  
press-freedom case the Supreme Court held that the government had not 
carried the burden required to enjoin their publication.214 More recently, 
the disclosure by Edward Snowden of confidential National Security 
Agency documents showed that the agency conducted unauthorized 
surveillance of American citizens.215 Already, some legal scholars are 
anticipating that government employees confronted by wrongdoing on 
the part of officials in the Trump Administration may consider blowing 
the whistle.216 
 1.   Confidentiality and Privilege Are Different 
All lawyers, no matter the identity of their client, are subject to the 
duty of confidentiality. As set forth in the Model Rules, it prohibits 
lawyers from disclosing or using to the disadvantage of a client any 
“information relating to the representation” of the client.217 The scope of 
information protected by the duty of confidentiality is considerably 
broader than the scope of communications protected by the  
attorney-client privilege. The evidentiary privilege covers only those 
communications made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal 
assistance.218 There has been a great deal of litigation and commentary 
concerning the attorney-client privilege in the context of investigations 
of possible criminal conduct by government officials.219 The granddaddy 
 
 214. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 215. See, e.g., Amanda Holpuch, Eric Holder Says Edward Snowden Performed “Public Service” 
with NSA Leak, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2016, 11:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
us-news/2016/may/30/eric-holder-edward-snowden-nsa-leak-public-service.  
 216. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Opinion, Are There Limits to Trump’s Power?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/opinion/are-there-limits-to-trumps-power.html (“If 
[Trump] directs the F.B.I., I.R.S. or Department of Homeland Security to harass his political 
opponents, civil servants will probably not cooperate¾indeed, they may blow the whistle.”). 
 217. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a), 1.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2003).  
 218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 219. Much of this litigation and commentary arose from the sprawling investigation by 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr of misconduct by President Clinton, originating with the 
Whitewater matter. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that Deputy 
White House Counsel could not assert attorney-client privilege to avoid answering grand jury 
questions concerning alleged criminal wrongdoing relating to Monica Lewinsky); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 925–26 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing denial of Independent Counsel’s motion to 
compel notes taken by White House counsel pertaining to Whitewater-related subjects, including 
billing records of Hillary Clinton’s former law firm); see also In re A Witness Before the Special Grand 
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of this controversy is of course the assertion by President Nixon, and the 
denial by the Supreme Court, of executive privilege in tape recordings of 
communications in the White House.220 One might therefore believe 
that, because the weight of authority is against an attorney-client 
privilege in the setting of an investigation of wrongdoing by a 
government official, the duty of confidentiality applies differently to 
government lawyers. However, there are subtle differences in both the 
foundations and the practical significance of the privilege and the duty of 
confidentiality which make the privilege cases inapposite. 
The attorney-client privilege is a creature of the law of evidence. As 
such, it is influenced by the policies underlying that body of law, 
including Wigmore’s “every man’s evidence” principle.221 The Eighth 
Circuit, in one of the Whitewater cases, cited Wigmore’s maxim and 
stated that any exceptions to that principle must be strictly construed as 
they stand in derogation of the search for truth.222 Even where the 
privilege has constitutional dimensions, as in the case of the Nixon tapes, 
the needs of the government’s criminal justice process are paramount.223 
The privilege does not block an official investigation of alleged criminal 
 
Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2002) (not a Starr vs. Clinton case; denying attorney-client 
privilege for communications between counsel to Illinois Secretary of State and then-Secretary, later 
Governor George Ryan). For representative commentary, see, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin & Allyson 
Phillips, Eliminating Political Maneuvering: A Light in the Tunnel for the Government Attorney-
Client Privilege, 39 IND. L. REV. 561, 572–82 (2006); Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as 
Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 IND. L.J. 469, 494–96 (2002); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Who “Owns” the Government’s Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473, 
474–49 (1998); Katherine L. Kendall, Note, Maintaining Confidence in Confidentiality: The 
Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Government Counsel, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1995,  
2006–07 (1999); Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of the Government Attorney–Client Privilege,  
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1682, 1702–16 (1999); Bryan S. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government 
Have an Attorney-Client Privilege?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 695, 718–21 (1999); Lory A. Barsdate, Note, 
Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J. 1725, 1733–44 (1988). Following 
Lindsey, courts have held that the attorney-client privilege also applies in civil litigation involving 
government entities. See, e.g., Spears v. First Am. eAppraiseIT, 75 F. Supp. 3d 208, 211–12 (D.D.C. 
2014) (documents reflecting communications between the Office of Thrift Supervision and agency 
counsel); A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition v. Jewell, 292 F.R.D. 44, 47–49 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 220. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). 
 221. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980). The principle has been 
summarized by the Supreme Court as follows: 
Dean Wigmore stated the proposition thus:  
  For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the 
public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man’s evidence. 
When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary 
assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and 
that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations 
from a positive general rule. 
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). 
 222. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 918 (citing Bryan, 339 U.S. at 323 (quoting 8 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940))). 
 223. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 919. 
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wrongdoing by government officials. It does not follow, however, that 
government lawyers are not subject to obligations of confidentiality that 
prohibit the voluntary disclosure of information¾such that, disclosure 
not in response to an official demand as part of a criminal investigation. 
The rule of professional conduct governing confidentiality has exceptions 
that differ from the exceptions to the privilege, for the simple reason that 
it embodies different policy considerations. The privilege cases reflect 
the competing interests of ascertaining the truth through 
litigation¾hence the Wigmore maxim and the narrow construction of all 
evidentiary privileges¾and, on the other side the free flow of confidential 
communications between attorney and client so that the attorney can 
learn all the relevant facts and then provide advice to the client on how 
to comply with the law, as the Supreme Court stated in Upjohn v. United 
States.224 The duty of confidentiality, by contrast, is concerned with only 
one side of that policy balance. It enforces the lawyer’s fiduciary duty of 
loyalty to the client, ensuring that confidential information will not be 
disclosed to the client’s detriment or used to further the interests of other 
clients or the attorney’s own interests.225 When it comes to interpreting 
the duty of confidentiality, there is no other side of the coin reflecting the 
societal interests in the truth coming to light. Finding out the truth is a 
role for the judicial system, but individual lawyers, including government 
lawyers, cannot disclose confidential client information in furtherance of 
the truth-finding function of the system. 
 2.   Exceptions to Confidentiality 
As President, Trump has railed repeatedly against “leaks” and 
“leakers,” although sometimes he uses the word expansively.226 For the 
purposes of this Article, an attorney would engage in prohibited conduct 
by disclosing confidential client information without express or implied 
 
 224. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981). 
 225. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r 1.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000); 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra 
note 114, § 18:5. The protection of confidential information is also the rationale underlying conflict of 
interest prohibitions in concurrent and successive representations. See LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 
cmt. b, § 132 cmts. a & b.  
 226. See, e.g., Ashley Parker, Trump Accuses Comey of Illegally Leaking Classified Information, 
WASH. POST (July 10, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-politics/wp/2017/07/10/trump-accuses-comey-of-illegally-leaking-classified-information/ 
?utm_term=.c029e4947483; Jordan Fabian, Trump Lawyer Accuses Comey of “Improperly” 
Leaking Memo to Press, THE HILL (June 8, 2017, 2:22 PM) http:// 
origin-nyi.thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news-other-administration/336985-trump-lawyer-
attacks-comey-over-leaks (discussing grievance filed by Trump’s personal attorney Marc Kasowitz, 
against James Comey for allegedly disclosing classified information, notwithstanding the fact that 
Comey was not acting in an attorney-client representative capacity when he had the communications 
with Trump). 
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authorization, or the informed consent of the client.227 Modifying the 
facts surrounding the firing of FBI Director James Comey,228 suppose a 
Justice Department lawyer participated in a meeting in which the 
President strongly suggested that the FBI should drop an investigation 
against a family member. The lawyer believes this request is a serious 
violation of an unwritten norm protecting the neutrality of the FBI. The 
lawyer further believes that the public interest in transparency and 
exposing wrongdoing by government officials would be furthered by 
disclosing the President’s directive to the FBI. 
For two decades after the promulgation of the 1983 Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6 contained few exceptions permitting 
disclosure of confidential information to serve the interests of third 
parties. There was a narrow exception permitting disclosure if necessary 
to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily harm resulting from a 
criminal act by the client.229 But the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
Commission that drafted the 1983 rules had rejected a proposed 
exception that would have permitted lawyers to disclose confidential 
information to prevent financial frauds.230 Lawyers and scholars argued 
vehemently that the lawyer’s role is characterized by client loyalty above 
all, and should not be compromised by establishing even a 
permission¾let alone an obligation¾to disclose confidential 
information to protect a non-client.231 An antifraud disclosure exception 
was proposed when the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission revised the rules 
in 2002, but the ABA House of Delegates rejected it.232 After the financial 
accounting frauds at Enron and other companies, and partly in response 
to political pressure from Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the ABA finally relented in 2003.233 Rule 1.6(b) now 
contains exceptions permitting disclosure of confidential information to 
the extent reasonably necessary to prevent, rectify, or mitigate 
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is 
reasonably certain to result from a criminal or fraudulent act of the client, 
in which the lawyer’s services have been used.234 This is still a relatively 
narrow exception, requiring that (1) the client’s conduct constitutes a 
 
 227. See PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6. 
 228. See Benjamin Wittes, What James Comey Told Me About Donald Trump, LAWFARE (May  
18, 2017, 8:02 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-james-comey-told-me-about-donald-trump. 
 229. See PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1). 
 230. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 719–23 (1989). 
 231. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer¾Client Confidence: The Model Rules’ Radical 
Assault on Tradition, 68 A.B.A. J. 428, 429–32 (1982). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen and Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of 
Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 731–32 (2004). 
 234. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2), (3). 
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crime or civil fraud, (2) the injury is to a third party’s financial interests 
or property, (3) the harm is substantial, (4) the harm is reasonably 
certain, and (5) the lawyer’s services were used in the commission of the 
crime or fraud. 
Thus, while the Eighth Circuit in the Grand Jury Subpoena 
attorney-client privilege case referred to a “general duty of public 
service,” which “calls upon government employees and agencies to favor 
disclosure over concealment,”235 it would be a serious misreading of the 
confidentiality rule to construe an exception permitting disclosure where 
it would generally be in the public interest. In the example of the Justice 
Department attorney who overheard Trump’s directive that the FBI drop 
an investigation, it may be the case that the public interest cuts in favor 
of disclosure, but disclosure would nevertheless be a violation of the duty 
of confidentiality stated in Model Rule 1.6. 
The antifraud exceptions, in both the Model Rules and state rules 
before 2003, are typically narrowly construed. For example, a lawyer may 
not disclose false statements made on job applications, misstatements of 
a client’s tax liability, or failure to file tax returns, if not technically 
frauds.236 The Washington Supreme Court confirmed the narrowness of 
the fraud exception when it issued a six-month suspension to a lawyer 
who had disclosed confidential client information that led to a state 
judge’s removal for corruption.237 The client, Hamilton, sought the 
lawyer’s assistance in purchasing a bowling alley; he told the lawyer that 
he was getting a good deal because the estate administrator, Anderson, 
had been “milking” the estate for years.238 Soon thereafter, Anderson was 
appointed to the bench. As the court put it, the lawyer became “obsessed” 
with Judge Anderson’s corruption. Despite Hamilton’s pointed refusal to 
consent to the disclosure, the lawyer either talked or sent documents to 
the FBI, the IRS, the Washington State Bar Association, the Washington 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, and several local newspapers.239 The 
lawyer was probably astonished to learn that the court was more 
concerned with his breach of his client’s trust than with the judge’s 
corruption. Although it erroneously conflated the privilege and the duty 
of confidentiality, the court’s reasoning shows the seriousness with which 
professional secrecy is regarded, even in the face of countervailing public 
interests in disclosure: 
 
 
 235. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 236. See, e.g., In re Smith, 991 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ind. 2013); In re Botimer, 214 P.3d 133, 140 
(Wash. 2009); In re Lackey, 37 P.3d 172, 177 (Or. 2002); Conn. Informal Ethics Op. 01-13 (2001). 
 237. In re Schafer, 66 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Wash. 2003). 
 238. Id. at 1038. 
 239. Id. at 1039. 
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Erosion of this privilege through willful breaches of a client’s trust by 
an attorney is undoubtedly harmful to society because these breaches 
weaken the public perception that people can seek assistance and rely 
on an attorney as an expert and counselor “free from the consequences 
or the apprehension of disclosure.”240 
The court concluded by reminding lawyers that they do not have a 
roving commission to right social wrongs, but are agents serving clients, 
with duties of loyalty and confidentiality: 
Douglas Schafer holds himself above the code of his profession and 
above the law¾he claims too much. Schafer asserts the right to define 
morality¾to carve out his own exceptions to a time-honored obligation 
of his chosen profession. A valid directive cannot be sacrificed to aid a 
lawyer in his personal vendetta. Who will be safe? The client who tells 
too much? The client who reveals an indiscretion unrelated to the 
subject of the representation? The potential exposure is enormous.241 
Lawyers considering disclosing confidential information in the 
public interest should note carefully the court’s distinction between the 
lawyer’s own moral code and “the code of his profession.”242 
Confidentiality rules are controversial.243 Some lawyers and 
commentators think they are too restrictive, with too few permissions to 
disclose information to protect third parties or the public,244 while others 
believe they are too porous and insufficiently protective of client 
interests. The extensive public debate that surrounded the adoption by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) of a relatively modest, 
incremental expansion in the authority of corporate lawyers to disclose 
evidence of client wrongdoing shows that this is an issue not likely to be 
resolved by deliberating about what is really in the public interest.245 
Maybe the public interest is best served by a strict duty of confidentiality 
that signals clearly to clients that they can trust lawyers never to reveal 
information learned in the course of representation. On the other hand, 
allowing some latitude for disclosure may give lawyers greater leverage 
in dealing with powerful clients who are up to no good, thereby 
 
 240. Id. at 1042 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)). 
 241. Id. at 1048. 
 242. Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331. 
 243. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 356 (1989). 
 244. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 135, at 110–11 (arguing that concerns about the rights of clients 
do not “explain why the rights of clients should always take precedence over the rights of everyone 
else, particularly where health and safety are at stake.”); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: 
A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 55–57 (1998); Daniel Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 33 (1998) (arguing that stringent lawyer confidentiality rules unfairly benefit lawyers in 
inter-professional competition with accountants, bankers, management consultants, and others 
offering similar services). 
 245. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1257–60 (2003); Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1287–88 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An 
Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294 n.3 (2003). 
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enhancing the socially valuable independence of the bar. Interpreting the 
exceptions for disclosure to prevent client fraud is therefore not wholly 
an exercise in moral reasoning. 
What about the exception permitting disclosure to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to “comply with other law or a court 
order”?246 The usual application of that exception is to court-ordered 
discovery, and the “reasonably necessary” limitation has been 
interpreted to require lawyers first to seek to quash a subpoena or 
otherwise make nonfrivolous objections to disclosure until the court 
orders it.247 It also permits disclosure in response to legal obligations 
established by child-abuse reporting statute and the requirement of the 
Internal Revenue Code to identify clients and report cash payments in 
excess of $10,000 on Form 8300.248 In these cases, a lawyer is potentially 
caught between two mandatory duties¾confidentiality under Rule 1.6 
and the statutory, regulatory, or judicially imposed obligation to disclose. 
The exception in Rule 1.6(b)(6) gives the lawyer discretion to extricate 
herself from this dilemma. But what if disclosure is merely permissive, 
not mandatory? This situation can arise when lawyers seek legal 
protection as a whistleblower. As the next Part shows, lawyer 
whistleblowing raises difficult, technical questions, the resolution of 
which is not as simple as asserting the priority of one duty over the other. 
 3.   Whistleblower Protection and Encouragement Statutes 
By providing certain protections to government employees, the 
Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) encourages them to reveal 
information about waste, fraud, and abuse.249 For example, federal 
agencies may not take adverse action against employees who disclosing 
evidence of a violation of law, “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of 
funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
health or safety.”250 Unfortunately, these categories line up only 
imprecisely with the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality for lawyers. 
As noted, Rule 1.6(b) does permit disclosure to prevent substantial bodily 
 
 246. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
 247. See, e.g., ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-385 at  
248–51 (1994); D.C. Bar Ethics Op. 288 (1999). 
 248. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The 
Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 222–23 (1992); New York City 
Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 1997-2 (1997) (explaining that lawyers may disclose child abuse under the 
“required by law” exception); United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 
1991) (discussing Form 8300 disclosures); Matthew P. Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, IRS Form 8300: 
The Attorney-Client Privilege and Tax Policy Become Casualties in the War Against Money 
Laundering, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 623, 675 (1996); Ellen S. Podgor, Form 8300: The Demise of Law as 
a Profession, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 485, 494, 522–30 (1992). 
 249. Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified 
as amended in various sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 250. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 
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harm to another, or to prevent, rectify, or mitigate substantial financial 
injury to another if the lawyer’s services have been used in connection 
with the fraud.251 But there is no exception permitting disclosure of 
violations of law more generally, nor of mismanagement, waste, or abuse 
of authority. For lawyers, whether disclosure falls within the scope of the 
WPA is neither here nor there; one must still ask the separate question 
whether the disclosures are permitted by the ethical rules. Roger 
Cramton has inferred from the absence of a federal statute addressing 
attorney confidentiality that the WPA supersedes the state rules 
requiring confidentiality.252 After the McDade Amendment,253 however, 
a state disciplinary authority would begin with the state rule rather than 
federal law. 
The conclusion that federal whistleblower-protection statutes do 
not preempt state rules of professional conduct is supported by recent 
decisions involving whistleblowing by private lawyers. This has become 
a frequently litigated issue as Congress has expanded encouragement to 
disclose wrongdoing by corporations. The Dodd-Frank Act, which 
required the SEC to issue regulations providing a financial bounty to 
employees who report violations of securities laws,254 now coexists with 
the much older False Claims Act,255 which allows those who provide 
information about fraud in the federal government to share in the 
government’s recovery. In United States v. Quest Diagnostics,256 the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action under 
the False Claims Act. The relator, a former in-house counsel for the 
defendant, had disclosed more confidential information than was 
permitted by the state disciplinary rules. As a former lawyer, the relator 
was subject to the New York version of Rule 1.9(c),257 whose permission 
to use or disclose confidential information tracks exactly the exceptions 
to confidentiality in Rule 1.6(b). As it happens, New York has an 
exception to the duty of confidentiality that differs from the Model Rules. 
The New York rules permit a lawyer to disclose confidential information 
“to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent 
the client from committing a crime.”258 The district court concluded, and 
the Second Circuit agreed, that the lawyer/relator disclosed more 
 
 251. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1), (2), (3). 
 252. Cramton, supra note 139. 
 253. See supra notes 127–31. 
 254. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)); see also Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iv) (2011). 
 255. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 256. United States v. Quest Diagnostics, 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 257. NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(c) (2009). The New York Rule is worded slightly 
differently than Model Rule 1.9(c), but is substantively the same. 
 258. NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2). 
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confidential information than was reasonably necessary to prevent his 
former client from committing a crime.259 
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the Second Circuit 
also held that the False Claims Act, with its broad encouragement to 
disclose confidential information to ferret out fraud on the federal 
government, does not preempt state rules of professional conduct.260 The 
exception in the New York confidentiality rule, permitting disclosure to 
the extent reasonably necessary to prevent the client from committing a 
crime, embodies the same balancing of interests reflected in the False 
Claims Act; thus, there can be no conflict between federal law and the 
state rule of professional conduct.261 The preemption analysis regarding 
other federal legislation may be different. For example, the SEC 
promulgated regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which establish 
standards of conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the 
SEC.262 These regulations expressly preempt conflicting state laws.263 
The conflict created by the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations is more 
theoretical than practical, as the only provision dealing with disclosure 
of confidential information is discretionary with the lawyer, not 
mandatory.264 A lawyer may exercise her discretion not to report out, but 
if she does elect to disclose confidential information, the disclosure may 
be permitted by either Rule 1.6(b)(2)–(3) or Rule 1.13(c).265 
Where there is no applicable exception, however, a lawyer reports 
out at his or her peril. In a case involving the former general counsel of a 
state banking regulator, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a lawyer 
could not maintain a wrongful discharge claim where she was fired for 
disclosing confidential information.266 The lawyer should have done first 
what all lawyers must do when confronted by the possibility of client 
wrongdoing¾raise the issue with the client and counsel the client to 
 
 259. See Quest Diagnostics, 734 F.3d at 165; see also id. at 158–59 (discussing factual and statutory 
predicates for claimed violations of federal Anti-Kickback Statute). 
 260. Id. at 163. 
 261. Id. at 164. 
 262. See SEC Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 70342, 17 C.F.R. § 205. 
 263. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (“Where the standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction where 
an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part, this part shall govern.”); Final Rule: 
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 
5, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm; see also Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 212 F. 
Supp. 3d 829, 857 (N.D. Cal. 2016). A federal district court held, in a retaliatory discharge action 
brought by a company’s former general counsel, that the strict duties of confidentiality under the 
California Rules of Professional Conduct are preempted by the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations permitting 
reporting to the SEC. The court found that the California rule conflicted with the permission granted 
by the SEC regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(1), to use a report of evidence of a material violation of 
law in connection with any litigation in which an attorney’s compliance with the regulations is an issue. 
 264. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d). 
 265. See supra notes 233–234, and accompanying text (analyzing antifraud disclosure 
permissions under Rule 1.6(b)). 
 266. Crandon v. State, 897 P.2d 92 (Kan. 1995). 
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comply with the law.267 The identity of the client as a government agency, 
and credible evidence of wrongdoing, does not confer immunity on a 
lawyer who discloses confidential information. 
A lawyer-whistleblower may not be in the clear even if disclosure of 
confidential information can be justified under a confidentiality 
exception. A financial bounty may create a conflict of interest under Rule 
1.7.268 The rule prohibits lawyers from representing a client if “there is a 
significant risk that the representation . . . will be materially limited by . . . 
a personal interest of the lawyer.”269 The interest in receiving a financial 
bounty for disclosing confidential information is clearly within the scope 
of personal interests that may create a material limitation on the lawyer’s 
representation of the client. Conflicts rules reflect a theme that once 
again bears repeating: The lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary, and a 
lawyer must always act solely to achieve the client’s lawful objectives.270 
Sometimes this duty requires the lawyer to forego some benefit that 
might be available to someone not in a fiduciary role.271 No one ever said 
it would always be easy to be a lawyer. But the obligation of loyalty to 
one’s client is a constitutive aspect of the lawyer-client relationship. 
F. LOYALTY, RESISTANCE, AND SABOTAGE 
Some Trump administration officials have complained about 
resistance from the “deep state.”272 Scholars use the term to describe a 
shadowy network of military and intelligence officers who exercise power 
over a civilian government; it is generally applied to nations like Turkey 
(where the term originated), Egypt, and Pakistan. As the saying goes, 
however, just because you are paranoid it does not mean they are not 
after you. There is a substantial body of public law scholarship in the 
United States arguing that constitutional limitations on the aggressive 
assertion of presidential authority is not a matter only of inter-branch 
competition, but may also depend on intra-branch separation of 
power.273 Competing power centers are employed to establish “rivalrous, 
 
 267. Id. at 99. 
 268. See New York County Lawyer’s Ass’n, Formal Op. 746, at 10–12 (2013). 
 269. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
 270. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 114, §§ 15:1, 17:3, 18:4. 
 271. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“[T]he general 
fiduciary principle requires that the agent subordinate the agent’s interests to those of the principal 
and place the principal’s interests first as to matters connected with the agency relationship.”); Roy R. 
Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal 
Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 241–42 (1994) (noting distinction between fiduciary and 
contract norms, particularly that one in a fiduciary relationship is not entitled to bargain at arms’ 
length with the other). 
 272. See David Remnick, First as Tragedy, NEW YORKER 29–30 (Mar. 20, 2017) (describing the 
complaints and the background of the phrase “deep state”). 
 273. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account 
of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016); Margo Schlanger, Offices of 
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heterogeneous institutional counterweights to protect liberty, promote 
democratic accountability, and ensure compliance with the rule of 
law.”274 Anticipating Trump’s threats to the rule of law, legal scholars 
quickly began to map out strategies of resistance by career employees of 
federal agencies. Jennifer Nou, for example, lists a number of techniques 
of bureaucratic opposition, including foot-dragging, building a record to 
make it difficult for political appointees to go against the wishes of career 
employees, leaking information to sympathetic journalists, working with 
internal watchdog offices, and public resignation.275 Should government 
lawyers consider engaging in such acts of sabotage? As it happens, these 
issues were aired decades ago in connection with lawyers joining another 
allegedly powerful, dangerous institution: large corporate law firms. 
In one of the early skirmishes in the Critical Legal Studies wars of 
the 1980s, Professor Duncan Kennedy cautioned Harvard Law School 
graduates heading for jobs at large law firms that they were entering an 
“evil,” even “demonic” realm of practice.276 
Corporate lawyers are in alliance with selfish business interests. 
They lobby against regulatory legislation and then try to pick it to pieces 
in the courts; they do their best to bust unions, or to preserve “union free 
environments;” and by tax practice they mean tax minimization. In 
exchange for all this antisocial activity, they receive grotesque monetary 
rewards, which they take without an apparent trace of shame¾indeed, 
with a combination of glee and smugness, as though to say, at one and 
the same time, how delightful it is to have ripped everyone else off, and 
that nothing could be more richly deserved than big bucks for top 
quality.277 
What is a progressive or radical law school graduate to do? Kennedy 
suggests the “politicization of corporate law practice,” by which he 
“means doing things and not doing things in order to serve left purposes, 
not because they fit or don’t fit” the rules of professional conduct.278 
Some of what he means by “politicization” is good advice from any 
political perspective. Faced with a client whose actions caused harm but 
 
Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014); Elizabeth 
Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011); Gillian E. 
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers,  
59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s 
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Cornelia Pillard, Unitariness and 
Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1297 (2006); Kagan, supra 
note 2. 
 274. Michaels, supra note 273, at 235. 
 275. Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, NOTICE AND COMMENT (Nov. 16, 2016), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou/. 
 276. Duncan Kennedy, Rebels from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law Firm from Within, 
HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 36 (1981). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 39. 
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who insists on defending a tort lawsuit using specious (but legally non-
frivolous) arguments to avoid liability, a law firm associate should 
consider the option of raising his or her concerns with supervisory 
lawyers. Maybe this is a firm “in which senior partners test associates to 
see if they are such sell-outs that they’ll do anything, no matter how 
ethically questionable.”279 That seems unlikely, but it may nevertheless 
be the case that more senior lawyers will appreciate the associate’s effort 
to introduce broader ethical considerations into the representation of the 
client. It may, of course, also be the case that senior lawyers raised the 
issues with the client and were directed to go along with the client’s 
decision to litigate the case to the hilt. If the associate either acquiesces 
in that decision or asks to be taken off the case, it seems likely that no 
harm would be done, either to the client or to the associate’s career. 
This anodyne advice is not the main thrust of Kennedy’s article, 
however. He is much more interested in comprehensive politicization, so 
that law students enter practice primed to “resist illegitimate hierarchy 
and alienation anywhere, any time, on any issue,”280 by using “sly, 
collective tactics within the institution where you work, to confront, 
outflank, sabotage or manipulate the bad guys.”281 It is hard to know 
whether to take this call to arms seriously,282 or regard it as nothing more 
than an attention-getting reminder that large organizations have 
structural features that make it possible for otherwise well-intentioned 
people to engage in serious wrongdoing.283 Hierarchies of command and 
obedience, like a lawyer-client relationship, are inevitable but have a 
well-known tendency to distort judgment.284 Awareness of this tendency 
may help avoid uncritical deference to authority, but there are 
psychological mechanisms that can make it difficult for people in the 
position of Kennedy’s associate to recognize the ethical dimension of 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 38. 
 281. Id. at 39. 
 282. Some readers have suggested that Kennedy’s hyperbole undercuts an important, albeit 
mainstream message. See, e.g., Philip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 247, 264 n.54 (1984); see also David W. Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: 
Fin de Siecle, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 995–96 (2001) (reviewing DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF 
ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997)) (observing the performative aspects of Kennedy’s writing). 
 283. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S 
RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011) (summarizing extensive psychological research on ethical 
perception and decision-making within organizations); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: 
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007) (building on groundbreaking social research in 
social psychology including the Stanford Prison Experiment); ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE 
WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988) (describing how norms and incentives of organizations 
constrain ethical decision making); IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY 
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982); John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into 
Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13 (David M. Messick 
& Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
 284. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 265–66 (2007). 
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their actions.285 Again, however, if Kennedy is concerned only with 
alerting lawyers to the danger of becoming enmeshed in organizational 
wrongdoing, it is hard to find fault with his advice, even if it is 
mischaracterized as “politicizing” legal practice. 
The legal and ethical shortcoming with Kennedy’s battle plan (apart 
from the pragmatic problems that come from sabotaging your employer) 
is that lawyers owe strict duties of loyalty to their clients. The hallmark 
of any fiduciary relationship is the discretionary power of the agent over 
the principal.286 If a reader takes Kennedy at his word, he is advocating 
that lawyers abuse that power so their client will give up something to 
which they have a legal right. Kennedy is a critic of the whole apparatus 
of liberal legal rights,287 so this implication would likely not trouble him. 
To accept Kennedy’s ethical prescription in its strongest form is to stand 
outside the liberal project altogether, denying the legitimacy of the 
client’s rights simply because they are provided for by law. One could 
certainly do that as a theoretical matter, but in legal terms, the lawyer’s 
liability presupposes that a client is entitled to instruct its agents to use 
lawful means to pursue its lawful rights.288 There is latitude within the 
lawyer-client relationship to consult over the means by which to pursue 
the client’s objectives,289 and the rules of professional conduct also 
contemplate an ethical dialogue about the “moral, economic, social and 
political factors” implicated by the representation.290 But if the client in 
Kennedy’s hypothetical determines, after consultation, to defend a 
morally unjust position in the tort litigation based on a non-frivolous 
factual and legal defense, any sort of trickery employed to dupe the client 
into giving up its legal right would be a breach of fiduciary duty.291 All 
lawyers are responsible for complying with the rules of professional 
conduct,292 and given the vicarious liability of law firms for the 
 
 285. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 283, at 29–34 (describing phenomenon of “ethical fading”). 
 286. See, e.g., Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public 
Law Relations, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 285 (2015); Roy R. Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary 
Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 268 n.212 
(1994); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
879 (1988). 
 287. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997). 
 288. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000); see 
also id. § 50, cmt. d (“A lawyer must exercise care in pursuit of the client’s lawful objectives in matters 
within the scope of the representation. . . . The client’s objectives are to be defined by the client after 
consultation. . . .”). 
 289. Indeed, consultation over the means of representation is a duty under the Rules. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a), 1.4(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
 290. Id. at r. 2.1. 
 291. See LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. b (explaining that fiduciary duties owed to client 
include “dealing honestly with the client”). Liability for breach of fiduciary duty follows from duties 
specified by agency law. A lawyer would also be liable under tort principles for failing to perform 
services where the client reasonably relied on the lawyer’s undertaking to do so. See id. § 50 cmt. b. 
 292. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.2(a). The only exception to this rule is if the subordinate lawyer acts in 
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negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties of its employees,293 a firm 
would be well advised to fire any associate who took Kennedy seriously. 
As the analysis in Part II.F showed,294 government lawyers have fiduciary 
duties of loyalty that parallel those owed to private clients. As a matter of 
the legal duties of government lawyers, Kennedy-style covert subversion 
is impermissible. 
Not every act of resistance by a lawyer is necessarily “sabotage.” 
Lawyers have a well-known dual obligation to provide loyal, competent 
client service that still remains within the bounds of the law. A lawyer 
who refused to provide assistance to an agency’s unlawful acts would not 
be engaging in sabotage, she would be fulfilling a core ethical obligation. 
It is important to remember, however, that lawyers differ from other 
employees of the civil service exercising checking power over political 
appointees. Lawyers differ from other agents in that their power is 
limited by the client’s legal entitlements. Perhaps lawyers should spend 
time trying to get a recalcitrant client to understand the idea of 
legitimacy,295 and the fact that a law seems ill-advised does not alter the 
fact that a legitimate law need not be wise to create an obligation. In any 
event, just as one should not be too hasty to condemn legally motivated 
lawyer resistance as subversive, one should also not leap too quickly to 
the conclusion that intra-branch separation-of-powers considerations 
justify a particular act of resistance. 
G. IF NOT VOICE NOR LOYALTY, THEN EXIT¾RULE 1.16 
The Model Rules set out conditions for both mandatory and 
permissive withdrawal from a representation. The Rules requires the 
lawyer to withdraw when “the representation will result in violation of 
the rules of professional conduct or other law.”296 Interestingly, the rule 
does not contain a mens rea term. Is withdrawal required when a lawyer 
knows, reasonably believes, or merely has a well-founded suspicion that 
the representation will result in a violation of law? This omission is 
striking in light of the inclusion of a mens rea term in one of the 
permissive withdrawal rules. Rule 1.16(b)(2) gives the lawyer discretion 
to withdraw, but does not require it, when “the client persists in a course 
of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is criminal or fraudulent.” Other rules addressing client 
wrongdoing, such as the permission to disclose confidential information 
 
accordance with the supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional 
duty. See id. at r. 5.2(b). 
 293. See LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58. 
 294. See supra notes 88–121 and accompanying text. 
 295. Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and 
Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1625 (2006). 
 296. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
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and the obligation to report corporate wrongdoing up the chain of 
command, similarly include express mens rea provisions.297 As one of the 
drafters of the Model Rules has argued, the omission of a mens rea 
standard should not be interpreted as creating strict liability, but it is still 
not immediately clear what standard applies.298 The only thing to do, 
then, is try to interpret the rule in light of its purpose and the principles 
of the law of lawyering.299 Requiring lawyers to withdraw when ongoing 
representation would result in a violation of law backstops the 
prohibition on a lawyer counseling or assisting a client in committing a 
criminal or fraudulent act.300 Since that rule contains a knowledge 
standard, it would be reasonable to require lawyers to withdraw only 
when they know that continuing to act on behalf of the client would result 
in a violation of law. 
Although the mandatory withdrawal rule is relatively narrow, it is 
quite a simple matter to find a ground for permissive withdrawal. It is 
allowed in any case where “withdrawal can be accomplished without 
material adverse effect on the interests of the client,”301 and most 
government lawyers work on teams or in offices where other lawyers are 
available to pick up the slack if one lawyer leaves. In general, it is unlikely 
that any one lawyer leaving would result in a material adverse effect. 
Even if it did, a lawyer may still withdraw by citing “fundamental 
disagreement” with the client’s action.302 Morally motivated withdrawal 
and conscientious objection fall within this provision of the rule. Finally, 
a catch-all provision allows withdrawal for good cause.303 A lawyer who 
wished to resign from government employment would therefore almost 
certainly not be subject to discipline for doing so. 
The most notorious historical precedent for government lawyers 
resigning in protest of the president’s disrespect for the rule of law is the 
so-called “Saturday Night Massacre” of 1973.304 President Nixon’s 
Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, appointed Special Prosecutor 
Archibald Cox to investigate the Watergate break-in. Cox angered Nixon 
by issuing a subpoena for tape recordings made by Nixon of 
 
 297. See Id. at r. 1.6(b)(2), (3) (reasonable belief standard), r. 1.13(b) (knowledge standard). 
 298. Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1, 15, 18 (2010). 
 299. Id. at 31. 
 300. See  PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (“[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, 
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent”). 
 301.  PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(1). 
 302. Id. at  r. 1.16(b)(4). 
 303. Id. at r. 1.16(b)(7). 
 304. See, e.g., KENNETH GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997); Kenneth B. 
Noble, Bork Irked by Emphasis on His Role in Watergate, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1987, at A22; Carroll 
Kilpatrick, President Abolishes Prosecutor’s Office; FBI Seals Records, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at 
A1, A3. For the history of the Watergate crisis as a whole, see STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF 
WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON (1990). 
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conversations in the Oval Office. Nixon ordered Richardson to fire Cox, 
even though it was illegal to fire the Special Prosecutor without cause. 
Richardson refused the order and resigned in protest, as did his deputy, 
William Ruckelshaus. “You owe a duty of loyalty to the president that 
transcends most other duties,” Ruckelshaus told a gathering of former 
U.S. attorneys in 2009. But “there are lines. . . . In this case, the line was 
bright and the decision was simple.”305 
It fell to acting head of the Justice Department, Solicitor General 
Robert Bork, to fire Cox, which he did (intriguingly, Bork stated in a book 
published after his death in 2013 that Nixon offered him the next 
available Supreme Court vacancy if he got rid of the troublesome Cox.)306 
It was clear almost immediately that Nixon miscalculated. Public opinion 
rapidly coalesced around the view that the scandal was not a “third-rate 
burglary,” as Nixon’s press secretary called it, but a massive abuse of 
presidential power.307 Leon Jaworski replaced Cox as Special Prosecutor 
and the House Judiciary Committee began considering impeachment 
proceedings against Nixon. 
Richardson and Ruckelshaus are generally regarded as having acted 
honorably, even heroically, by resigning rather than complying with 
Nixon’s instructions. More recently, another lawyer whose threat to 
resign was regarded as heroic was Deputy Attorney General James 
Comey, then number two in the Justice Department behind John 
Ashcroft.308 In early 2004, the Bush Administration was running into 
difficulty obtaining legal blessing for the National Security Agency’s  
so-called warrantless wiretapping program (which involved large-scale 
data mining in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). 
Comey met with Ashcroft and explained his concerns about the legality 
of the program. When Ashcroft was suddenly stricken by pancreatitis and 
was hospitalized for gallbladder surgery, Comey became acting Attorney 
General. He explained to Vice President Cheney, White House Counsel 
Alberto Gonzales, and other high-level political officials that he would 
not sign off on the program. In a TV-worthy episode, Gonzales and the 
White House Chief of Staff visited Ashcroft in his hospital room, seeking 
his signature. Comey rushed to the scene, where despite his heavy dose 
of painkillers, Ashcroft managed to lucidly explain that Comey was now 
 
 305. Susan Brenneman, Watergate’s Saturday Night Massacre Gets More Interesting with Age, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/18/news/la-ol-saturday-night-
massacre-watergate-20131018. 
 306. See ROBERT H. BORK, SAVING JUSTICE: WATERGATE, THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE, AND 
OTHER ADVENTURES OF A SOLICITOR GENERAL 86 (2013). 
 307. U.S. News Staff, Watergate and the White House: The ‘Third-Rate Burglary’ That Toppled a 
President, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 19, 1974, at 24–29. 
 308. For a recounting of these events, from which this paragraph was drawn, see ERIC LICHTBLAU, 
BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 176–85 (2008); see also Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, 
Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST, May 16, 2007, at A1. 
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the attorney general. Comey of course refused to sign the authorization, 
so the White House decided to go ahead with the program anyway. At 
this point, Comey prepared his resignation letter, and several other 
Justice Department lawyers agreed to resign with him. Bush blinked. The 
program was modified to meet Comey’s objections. 
The highly publicized confrontation between Comey and Gonzales 
came to be regarded as “the biggest revolt at the Justice Department since 
the infamous Saturday Night Massacre.”309 Comey would almost 
certainly have been within his rights as an attorney to resign in protest of 
the government’s failure to obtain Justice Department clearance for the 
data-gathering program. It is a bit of a close call whether withdrawal 
would have been permissible, because “the client [would have been] 
persist[ing] in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent.”310 The issue is not 
whether Comey had a reasonable belief that the government’s conduct 
would have been criminal¾he plainly did under the circumstances¾but 
rather whether the conduct would involve the lawyer’s services if the 
administration did not obtain the usual signoff from the Attorney 
General. Because Justice Department approval of programs like the NSA 
wiretapping are generally obtained, the lack of approval could be 
construed as a kind of participation in the conduct. Nevertheless, there is 
no need to choose only one basis for withdrawal, and Comey could also 
have believed that the administration was insisting “upon taking 
action . . . with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.”311 The 
dramatic confrontation between Comey, Gonzales, and White House 
Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and Comey’s subsequent refusal to meet with 
Card without a witness present,312 is about as “fundamental” as a lawyer-
client disagreement can get. As explained in Part II.F, covert strategies of 
resistance breach the lawyer’s most important fiduciary duties. Overt, 
public strategies of resistance, like Comey’s threat to resign along with 
other attorneys at the Justice Department, are consistent with the ethical 
responsibilities of lawyers. 
III.  THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL DETERMINACY 
The last Part was intended as a constructive normative account of 
the ethical role of government lawyers. To summarize the inherent 
rationality of the law of lawyering: It envisions a highly fiduciary role in 
which lawyers use reasonable care and effort to provide accurate, 
unbiased advice to clients, who then are responsible for deciding how to 
 
 309. LICHTBLAU, supra note 308, at 184. 
 310. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
 311. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(4). 
 312. See LICHTBLAU, supra note 308, at 182–83. The witness he insisted upon was the Solicitor 
General of the United States, Ted Olson. 
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proceed. There is nothing wrong with advising the client that one 
proposed route to its goal is likely contrary to applicable law, but 
suggesting there may be a different route to the same goal that would be 
legally permissible.313 In that limited sense all lawyers can be said to be 
zealous advocates, but when lawyers are acting in an advisory capacity, 
they have an obligation to provide candid advice to clients concerning the 
law, not merely to come up with an argument that passes the  
straight-face test and would not subject a litigation advocate to judicial 
sanctions. Lawyers should not be afraid of someone else second-guessing 
them if they make a judgment call on a disputed issue of law, provided 
they fully informed their client about the extent of uncertainty and the 
countervailing arguments. In carrying out these obligations, any lawyer, 
including a lawyer representing a government agency, should not act 
directly on what he or she believes to be the public interest. It is for a 
government client to make the determination of what is in the public 
interest, just as it is for a private client to decide on the objectives of the 
representation. Despite loose talk in judicial dicta and some legal 
scholarship, there is no freestanding obligation for government lawyers 
to serve the public interest, and courts are extremely reluctant to 
recognize new public-interest exceptions to doctrines such as the duty of 
confidentiality. 
Taken together, the legal rights and obligations that comprise the 
law governing lawyers construct what might be called a “service 
conception” of the lawyer’s role.314 That obligation of service runs to a 
client, which in this case is the administration of the President-elect. 
Government lawyers do not have an open commission to serve the public 
interest; they are agents who must carry out the lawful instructions of 
their principal. It cannot be emphasized enough, however, that the 
lawyer’s role is distinguished from that of any other agent by the addition 
of an affirmative obligation to ensure that the conduct of the principal 
complies with the law.315 While Model Rule 1.2(d) says only that a lawyer 
must not “counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,”316 that rule does not exhaust the 
law of agency. The Rule also contemplates the lawyer assisting the client 
in determining the legality of its proposed course of conduct. It provides 
that the lawyer “may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed 
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make 
a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
 
 313. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1715 (2011) 
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)). 
 314. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 315. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 316. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d). 
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application of the law.”317 That makes sense. One of the important 
insights at the intersection of clinical legal education and professional 
responsibility scholarship is that clients do not come to lawyers with a set 
of goals and interests that are neatly prepackaged, ready to be analyzed 
by the lawyer for their lawfulness; rather, the client’s ends often emerge 
through a process of dialogue with the lawyer.318 Rule 1.2(d) recognizes 
that the agency relationship includes counseling the client to determine 
the limits of the law, and Rule 2.1 permits the lawyer also to counsel the 
client on and a prohibition on “other considerations such as moral, 
economic, social and political factors.”319 But when it comes to actually 
providing assistance to the client, which for a government lawyer may 
include providing the crucial legal sign-off on the program, the lawyer’s 
power ends where the client’s legal right ends. The client may decide not 
to comply with the law, but the lawyer may not assist the client’s course 
of conduct unless it is legally permitted.320 
This obligation runs smack into the problem of legal realism.321 As 
David Wilkins observed a quarter century ago, in what is still one of the 
best treatments of the relationship between legal ethics and general 
jurisprudence: 
Lawyers should help clients obtain “lawful” objectives only by “legally 
permissible means,” with “lawful” referring both to the limitations 
generally applicable to all citizens and to the special obligations 
imposed on lawyers by the rules of professional responsibility.322 
This conception of the lawyer’s ethical role is only plausible if the 
boundaries of the law are identifiable independent of the lawyer’s own 
moral and political commitments, and flow from democratically 
accountable sources of power¾such as, positive law.323 Wilkins clearly 
identifies the problem: 
 
 
 317. Id. 
 318. See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 137, at 124; William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client 
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991). 
 319. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1. Stephen Pepper similarly divides up the lawyer’s role into providing 
information about the law¾access to law, as he calls it¾and providing assistance in unlawful conduct. 
See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and 
Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995). 
 320. See Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Clients’ Misconduct 
Under State Law, 75 DEF. COUNSEL J. 130 (2008); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer 
Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 683 (1981) 
(concluding, as a matter of agency law, that a lawyer acts improperly by “giving advice that encourages 
the client to pursue the conduct or indicates how to reduce the risks of detection, or by performing an 
act that substantially furthers the course of conduct.”). 
 321. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE COMMON 
LAW WORLD 106–22 (2011) (providing overview of legal realist claims). 
 322. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 471. 
 323. Id. at 472–73. 
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If, as some have argued, it is possible to provide a ‘legal’ justification 
for virtually any action, it is hard to see how the requirement that 
zealous advocacy must occur within the bounds of the law meaningfully 
restrains a lawyer’s decision making.324 
One need not endorse the strongest CLS-inspired version of this 
position, i.e., that it is possible to provide a legal justification for virtually 
any action, and that law is nothing other than ordinary politics plus 
mystification.325 The constructive normative vision of lawyering 
defended here is threatened by even a moderate version of the realist 
claim. The law in some cases, particularly those involving developing 
technologies, novel social and political phenomena, or moments of acute 
crisis, may be relatively indeterminate. In that case, a lawyer may find it 
difficult to locate the boundaries of the law with much confidence. 
Former OLC lawyer Dawn Johnsen has argued against an 
“advocacy” model of government lawyer advising, in which lawyers 
should understand their role as putting forward the plausible arguments 
supporting actions consistent with the President’s preferred policies.326 
Rather than presenting merely plausible positions, government lawyers 
should provide the “best, most accurate” interpretations of applicable 
law.327 This responsibility is particularly important where judicial review 
of presidential action is unlikely. The legal rights of citizens affected by 
government actions depend on the advice of government lawyers where 
secrecy or institutional limitations (such as non-justiciability doctrines) 
make it unlikely that a court will review the legality of the action.328 But 
we are all realists now, right? Every realist can see the objection to 
Johnsen’s argument from a mile away: How can a “best view of the law” 
standard be operationalized, either as a conduct rule to guide lawyers in 
their advising function or as a decision rule to guide courts in disciplining 
lawyers, when the law itself is fluid, evolving, and susceptible to a 
plurality of reasonable interpretations? Every lawyer can cite examples 
of arguments once considered frivolous and now accepted as mainstream 
positions. In addition to the standard example of the constitutionality of 
the “separate but equal” principle before Brown, Sanford Levinson cites 
a confident statement from 1965¾amusing to me as a torts professor¾ 
 
 324. Id. at 475–76. 
 325. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 462, 463 (1987) (differentiating strong and weak indeterminacy claims); Dorf, supra note  
33, at 883 (defining legal indeterminacy as the thesis that, in more than a trivial number of cases, legal 
norms by themselves do not sufficiently warrant the outcome). 
 326. Johnsen, supra note 11, at 1579–80 (2007); see also Moss, supra note 17, at 1309–12 
(advocating a “best view of the law” model for government lawyer advising). 
 327. Id. at 1580. 
 328. Id. at 1587–88; see also Morrison, supra note 11, at 1710–11 (citing features of OLC opinions, 
including their practical finality and treatment by other government actors as authoritative, that make 
the role of lawyers in the Office unique). 
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as a kind of reductio ad absurdium of the view that one can construct 
anything like a “best view”: 
[I]t seems clear that there is no substantial likelihood that any court 
will act today, as a matter of common law development, to substitute 
comparative negligence for an existing rule of contributory negligence 
in the general accident field. Indeed, lawyers will not even consider 
arguing this possibility to a court.329 
Not long afterwards, comparative negligence replaced contributory 
negligence almost everywhere.330 The confident assertion that 
comparative negligence is inconceivable looks silly in hindsight, even if it 
appeared at the time to be the best view of the law. This illustrates the 
problem with indeterminacy: The possibility of a lawyer being subject to 
discipline for giving legal advice that turns out to be wrong in hindsight. 
Now imagine a lawyer trying to ascertain the “best view” of the law 
to help the President carry out his policy objectives, but facing intense 
pressure from high-level politically appointed officials.331 This is exactly 
the atmosphere lawyers in the Bush Administration faced as they 
searched for limits on the government’s lawful powers in response to the 
threat of terrorism. Michael Hayden, the Director of the National 
Security Agency and later head of the CIA, was widely reported to have 
urged a specific interpretive attitude on government lawyers: “My spikes 
will have chalk on them. . . . As a professional, I’m troubled if I’m not 
using the full authority allowed by law.”332 This was a bipartisan stance 
in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Democratic Senator Bob Graham 
expressed his displeasure, at a confirmation hearing for the CIA’s 
General Counsel, with “cautious lawyering” and “risk aversion” in advice 
given by lawyers for the CIA. “We need excellent, aggressive lawyers who 
give sound, accurate legal advice, not lawyers who say no to an otherwise 
legal operation just because it is easier to put on the brakes.”333 Another 
watchword for the type of legal advice sought was “forward-leaning,” 
meaning aggressive and willing to take risks.334 If the law is 
indeterminate, or at least relatively under-determined, as legal realists 
claim, how can lawyers resist as they hear bloodcurdling intelligence 
briefings and are told to get with the program? 
There is a pragmatic problem here, too. Government lawyers worry 
their conduct will be judged in hindsight using legal standards that were 
not clear ex ante. For example, in the proceedings that followed the 
 
 329. Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything At All?, 24 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 353, 372 (1986) (quoting P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 256 (1965)). 
 330. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 67, at 468–69 (5th ed. 1984). 
 331. See ACKERMAN, supra note 206, at 18–19 (noting the pressure on government lawyers created 
by “telephone calls and other importuning from the White House.”). 
 332. MAYER, supra note 24, at 69; GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 78. 
 333. GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 92. 
 334. See Tim Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1. 
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revelation of the memos on interrogation techniques, several OLC 
lawyers expressed their concern that if Yoo and Bybee were disciplined 
for the advice they gave in the torture memos, it would have an in 
terrorem effect on lawyers giving potentially unpopular advice.335 
Former OLC head Timothy Flanigan, for example, stated: 
I believe that adverse action by OPR against Judge Bybee or Professor 
Yoo would have a long-term chilling effect on the willingness of OLC 
attorneys to render opinions on difficult and sensitive areas of law. 
Such an action will be seen as a strong signal to OLC attorneys to avoid 
any legal conclusions or analysis that, although a reasonable 
application of relevant authority, may be controversial. This, in 
turn, will tend to artificially limit the range of legal opinions available 
to the President.336 
The bolded language in Flanagan’s statement is central to the 
analysis. Merely saying the magic words “chilling effect” is not a sufficient 
argument for limiting sanctions. If a lawyer had a reasonable legal basis 
in relevant authority to advise the President that a certain course of 
action was permissible, then it would be a bad thing if the lawyer were 
deterred from giving that advice by the threat of ex post disciplinary 
exposure. If, on the other hand, a lawyer was deterred from giving advice 
for which there was not sufficient support in applicable law, then the 
possibility of punishment has had its desired effect. It all comes down to 
whether there is sufficient content in the idea of “reasonable application 
of relevant authority” that a regulator can distinguish between 
adequately supported advice and that which violates the requirement of 
providing candid, independent advice. 
I am focusing on this passage, which did not even appear in the final 
Margolis Memo, because it points to the solution to the problem of legal 
realism and indeterminacy. The solution is grounded in the political 
value of legality, or the ideal of the rule of law. The rule of law is a highly 
contested concept.337 It is sometimes used loosely to refer a good 
government under law, such as one characterized by the existence of 
strong property rights and investor protections, which may correlate with 
the size of a country’s capital markets,338 or protection for human dignity 
and human rights.339 The rule of law or legality may also refer to formal 
features a legal system ought to have, such as laws that are publicly 
promulgated, clear and understandable, openly and impartially 
 
 335. See Bybee Response, supra note 34, at 149 (quoting former OLC lawyers Jack Goldsmith and 
Timothy Flanigan, and former Attorney General Michael Mukasey). 
 336. Id. (emphasis added). 
 337. See Andrei Marmor, The Rule of Law and Its Limits, 23 L & PHIL. 1 (2004). 
 338. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131,  
1131–32 (1997). 
 339. See, e.g., TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 49–50 (2010). 
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administered, and at the very least capable of being obeyed.340 In the 
British Commonwealth, it is often associated with Dicey’s critique of 
official discretion.341 Dicey’s focus on discretion shows up in modern 
jurisprudential thinking as the long-running debate over whether legal 
reasoning must be formal, neutral, or even mechanical, in some way,342 
or whether¾to borrow the title of a classic article by then¾Professor 
Scalia¾the rule of law must be understood as a law of rules, as opposed 
to equitable norms, standards, or principles.343 Libertarians like to cite 
Friedrich Hayek’s conception of the rule of law, which emphasized ex 
ante certainty and predictability as the key to reconciling freedom with 
the necessity of having laws that limit the liberty of individuals.344 How 
can the ideal of the rule of law do any normative work in legal theory if it 
seems that theorists cannot agree on its content? Is “rule of law” just a 
“general stand-in for everything nice one could ever want to say about a 
political system”?345 The normative conception of lawyer professionalism 
defended in this Article rests on two presuppositions: First, that the 
concept of the rule of law is meaningful, notwithstanding the diversity of 
conceptions in which it may be expressed; second, that the regulative 
ideal of legality has nothing to do with legal determinacy, but depends 
instead on a “culture of argument”¾a system for reasoned analysis 
through which norms can be contested and established.346 
The rule of law, properly understood, is concerned with the types of 
reasons that are given, or in a hypothetical analysis may be given, in 
justification of any action. What other conceptions of the rule of law, with 
 
 340. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210 (1979); 
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1964). 
 341. See A. V. DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 215 
(London, Macmillan 1885). 
 342. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (reviewing conceptions of 
formalism emphasizing the limitation on the decisionmaker’s freedom of choice); Owen Fiss, The 
Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1986) (distinguishing politics, which is about “mere” 
preferences, from adjudication, which is aimed at applying, or even creating, public values); ROBERTO 
MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 66–67 (1975) (criticizing legal liberalism for being 
unable to solve the problem of arbitrariness, in the sense that any legal restriction placed on the ability 
of one person to satisfy her desires will necessarily benefit some individuals more than others). 
 343. See Antonin J. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). The 
literature on rules and standards is immense. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE 
OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen Sullivan, The Justice of Rules and 
of Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 645 (1991); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
 344. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80–84 (50th Anniversary ed. 1994). 
 345. Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & 
PHIL. 137, 139 (2002). 
 346. Woolley, supra note 121, at 768. 
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their laundry lists of precepts, are all getting at is this basic idea: There is 
a difference between governing a political community lawfully and doing 
so by other means, such as issuing orders and directives¾managerial 
direction, as Lon Fuller calls it.347 There is also a difference between 
acting lawfully, as opposed to exercising the naked power to act and not 
suffer adverse consequences. When one claims to act or command 
lawfully, one is claiming to do so as a matter of right. In turn, there is an 
implicit claim that the right has been established in the name of the 
political community. The justification of an action or command thus 
proceeds based on reasons that affected persons can grasp and, in 
principle, accept. By demanding reasons in justification for directives or 
actions, the idea of the rule of law embodies an understanding of citizens 
of a liberal democratic political community as equal bearers of rights, and 
as moral agents. Legal systems, as opposed to other systems of norms, 
commands, or managerial directives: 
Operate by using, rather than suppressing and short-circuiting, the 
responsible agency of ordinary human individuals. Ruling by law is 
quite different from herding cows with a cattle prod or directing a flock 
of sheep with a dog. . . . The publicity and generality of law look to what 
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks called “self-application,” that is, to 
people’s capacities for practical understanding, for self-control, and for 
the self-monitoring and modulation of their own behavior, in relation 
to norms that they can grasp and understand.348 
Nothing in this way of understanding the rule of law requires that 
the conduct of those subject to it be regulated by clear rules promulgated 
in advance, and not admitting of any discretion in their application, 
either by subjects or officials. Nor does it require that the law give only 
one right answer to a question one might ask about whether an action is 
lawful. What is essential, however, is that an action be justified by 
reasons that can, in principle, be endorsed as being our reasons¾that is, 
grounded upon political decisions made by the community concerning 
the allocation of rights and duties. 
Trying to obtain a legal justification for an action is a form of 
voluntary self-restraint by political officials. It recognizes the limits of the 
rightful exercise of power. In the controversy over the NSA wiretapping 
program, which James Comey refused to authorize, the administration 
had the option to go ahead with it anyway. The CIA and military 
interrogators could have chosen to torture detainees at “black sites” in 
allied countries without obtaining legal approval. In both of these cases, 
however, high-level political officials sought legal authorization. One 
reason was obviously pragmatic. As Jack Goldsmith reports, CIA 
 
 347. See David Luban, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL ETHICS 
AND HUMAN DIGNITY 99, 109–10 (2007). 
 348. Waldron, supra note 9, at 26–27. 
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interrogators and their supervisors were looking for a “golden shield”349 
in the form of an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, which would 
serve as a kind of advance pardon for actions that might subsequently be 
regarded as at the limits of the law.350 But there are also noninstrumental 
reasons for seeking legal authorization for government action. United 
States Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora, who became one of the 
internal critics of the Bush Administration’s interrogation policies, 
strongly believed the use of power was illegitimate if not exercised in the 
service of the principles and values embodied in the Constitution.351 
Mora, the child of Cuban and Hungarian immigrants who fled 
Communist regimes, was raised “to have very strong views about the rule 
of law, totalitarianism, and America.”352 
The challenge is to translate these high-minded ideals into practical 
ethical guidance for lawyers serving as advisors to government 
officials.353 Some of the statements made by President-elect Trump 
during the campaign suggest an attitude of outright defiance of 
unambiguous law. No prosecutor could hope to obtain a conviction 
against someone for burning a flag, for example, no matter how strongly 
the President feels about the matter.354 Trump’s repeated statements of 
contempt toward legal limitations on his power are more worrisome 
when considered in light of the problem of legal realism. The law in most 
cases is not as clear as the constitutionality of flag burning. Making the 
task of ethical guidance more complex is the permission built into the 
lawyer’s role to work with the client to achieve the client’s objectives 
through lawful means. A lawyer is not limited to giving disinterested yes-
or-no advice. She may consider the client’s goals, analyze the applicable 
legal authorities, and suggest means to accomplish the client’s ends 
 
 349. GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 144. 
 350. Id. at 96 (quoting a senior Justice Department prosecutor saying that “[i]t is practically 
impossible to prosecute someone who relied in good faith on an OLC opinion, even if the opinion 
turned out to be wrong.”). 
 351. See MAYER, supra note 24, at 214. 
 352. Id. at 217. 
 353. See Woolley, supra note 121, at 775 (“the abstract identification of the lawyer’s duties when 
advising a client does not necessarily translate clearly into rules governing how a lawyer ought to 
practice.”). 
 354. Soon after the election Trump tweeted, “Nobody should be allowed to burn the American 
flag¾if they do, there must be consequences¾perhaps loss of citizenship or a year in jail!” See George 
Leef, Opinion, Oh, Oh – Trump Thinks That Flag Burning Should Be Criminalized, Forbes (Dec. 5, 
2006, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2016/12/05/oh-oh-trump-thinks-that 
-flag-burning-should-be-criminalized. Under Texas v. Jonson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), it is settled that 
burning the American flag as a protest is protected speech under the First Amendment, and United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), established that a federal statute banning flag burning would 
be unconstitutional. It would take a constitutional amendment to actually criminalize flag burning, 
and the last tiem passage was attempted was in 2006. See Carl Hulse & John Holusha, Amendment 
on Flag Burning Fails by One Vote in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/washington/27cnd-flag.html. 
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within the limits of the law.355 Some of this complexity is helpful because 
it shifts the focus from the content of the lawyer’s conclusion about the 
law to the process by which the conclusion was reached. 
Picking up on suggestions from Fuller, Luban, and Waldron,356 I 
contend that the rule of law serves as a regulative ideal for an activity, not 
a truth-functional proposition about the content of the law.357 Going back 
to the highlighted passage above from a former OLC lawyer, the ethical 
analysis of lawyers in an advisory role should focus on whether the advice 
represents a reasonable application of relevant authority. The term 
“reasonable application” should be understood as a criterion for how well 
a practical activity is carried out, not a standard for the accuracy of the 
 
 355. On this point I disagree with David Luban’s heuristic that a candid, independent legal opinion 
would be one that would be more or less the same as it would have been if the client had wanted the 
opposite result. See Luban, supra note 347, at 198. It could very well be the case that the state of the 
law is such that a persuasive argument could be given in good faith that the same conduct is either 
permitted or not. Consider, as an example, the state of play as of January 15, 2017, of the legal 
permissibility of a lawyer assisting an individual or corporation in starting up a recreational marijuana 
dispensary in a state in which the sale and possession of small quantities of marijuana for recreational 
use is permitted under state law. Such possession and sale remains a crime under federal law, even 
though the Justice Department had announced a policy of nonenforcement. States such as Washington 
and Colorado in which recreational cannabis use is legal have a version of the rule of professional 
conduct which provides, “[a] lawyer shall not . . . assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). Is it permissible to provide 
assistance to a dispensary that is committing a violation of federal law? State ethics opinions are all 
over the map, with Maine and North Dakota prohibiting such assistance, Arizona saying it is fine as 
long as there is no change in federal enforcement policy, Washington State permitting it only because 
of an amendment to the comments to the Washington rule; the San Francisco Bar permitting lawyer 
assistance in activity that is unlawful under federal law on the ground (which I think is pure sophistry) 
that “[a]ssisting the client who wants to comply with state and local laws is not the same as advising 
the client to violate federal laws.” See Wash. St. Bar Ass’n Op. 2015-01; Bar Ass’n of San Francisco 
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2015-1; North Dakota Op. 14-02 (2014); Arizona Op. 11-01 (2011); Maine Bar 
Op. 199 (2010). The point simply being that if I was ethics counsel to a state bar association, I believe 
it would be possible to provide a legal opinion in good faith that either a lawyer may provide this 
assistance or not. If asked for the best view of the law, I would lean toward the prohibition, since 
nonenforcement is not the same as legal authorization. However, I can see where the “permission” 
states are coming from. Of course, most lawyers are not counsel to lawyer regulators, but the 
observation may be generalized. If two or more interpretations of applicable law can be given in good 
faith, a lawyer may advise the client based on an interpretation that aligns with the client’s objectives. 
See Woolley, supra note 121, at 778 (“A lawyer may frame his or her advice to accomplish the client’s 
goals, including adopting interpretations of the law that are favourable to the client (provided those 
interpretations remain reasonable.”)). The advice must reflect weaknesses in the client’s position, but 
it can nonetheless seek to accomplish the client’s goals, not merely to provide a disinterested 
assessment of them.”). 
 356. See Luban, supra note 347, at 103 (“Fuller characterizes natural law as a way of conducting a 
practical activity . . . rather than as a philosophical thesis about the truth conditions of a proposition 
of law”); Waldron, supra note 9, at 4 (“Law is an exceedingly demanding discipline intellectually, and 
the idea that it consists or could consist in the thoughtless administration of a set of operationalized 
rules with determinate meanings and clear fields of application is of course a travesty.”). 
 357. See Luban, supra note 347, at 103 (noting that for Fuller, “there is a characteristic morality 
associated with the ‘law job’” and this represents a categorically different approach to the relationship 
between law and morality). 
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conclusion. Legal realism and the relative indeterminacy of law should 
not give lawyers cause for alarm. Their conduct will not be evaluated ex 
post based on a determination that they got the law wrong. They need 
worry only that they be judged subsequently to have given insufficient 
attention and care to the process of reaching a good faith determination 
concerning the lawfulness of the client’s proposed course of action. 
I argued previously that the assessment of legal interpretation 
requires engagement with the craft values that inform good lawyering.358 
Criteria for excellent or even adequate performance are internal to the 
craft; they are given by the ends for which it is constituted.359 The 
constructive normative conception of the ethics of legal advising, as 
developed through the analysis of the law governing lawyers in Part II, 
maintains that the lawyer’s role as an advisor is to ensure the client has 
accurate information about what the law permits or requires. By 
implication, then, the reasonableness of a lawyer’s application of relevant 
authority can be assessed by considering evidence tending to show either 
that the lawyer tried to get the law right, or not. This evidence will likely 
include facts about the lawyer’s handling of adverse authority and 
counterarguments, consideration of the interpretive community’s 
assessment of the argument (since the exercise of judgment is by its 
nature a community-bound process that it makes reference to 
intersubjective criteria for the exercise and regulation of judgment),360 
and the completeness of the set of information provided to the client 
about the applicable law. Scholars who have thought carefully about the 
ethics of legal advising have largely converged on these criteria for the 
evaluation of lawyers’ interpretive judgment, which are procedural 
rather than substantive.361 
A process-centered ethics of advising carries with it some risk that a 
government lawyer’s conduct will be judged negatively in hindsight, 
perhaps by a disciplinary authority. To the extent one worries about legal 
determinacy, however, this approach holds less risk than an alternative 
that focuses on the accuracy of legal advice. Objective standards of 
reasonable conduct in torts also focus on conduct, not outcomes, 
 
 358. See WENDEL, supra note 7; W. Bradley Wendel, The Craft of Legal Interpretation, in 
INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT: FROM THE RULE OF THE KING TO THE RULE OF 
LAW 153 (Yasutomo Morigiwa et al. eds., 2011); see also Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). For a critique, see ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, FIGHTING FAIR: LEGAL ETHICS 
FOR AN ADVERSARIAL AGE 30–34 (2015). 
 359. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 187–91 (2d ed. 1984) (noting that any practice is 
goal-directed and therefore it would be incoherent to claim to be engaging in an activity without caring 
about the characteristic goods that are internal to that form of activity). 
 360. See Fiss, supra note 358; Gerald J. Postema, “Protestant” Interpretation and Social 
Practices, 6 L. & PHIL. 283 (1987); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960) (discussing 
“steadying factors” that retain arbitrary decisionmaking). 
 361. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 347, at 198–99; Woolley, supra note 121, at 778–79. 
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including in the closely-related field of professional malpractice law. A 
patient may experience side effects from a surgical procedure, but if the 
surgeon performed with the requisite level of skill, she would not be liable 
for malpractice. Social scientists have demonstrated that judgments 
about risk are strongly influenced by outcomes,362 so the fact that a 
plaintiff suffered an adverse outcome will influence a judge or jury 
evaluating whether the defendant used reasonable care. This may have 
the effect of converting a negligence rule into strict liability.363 It is not 
necessarily unreasonable for lawyers to be nervous about having their 
advice evaluated after the fact. However, disciplinary proceedings 
already employ safeguards to guard against hindsight bias in judgments 
concerning the reasonableness of lawyers’ advising. For one thing, the 
standard of proof is quite high.364 The standard for discipline for lawyers 
in the Department of Justice is whether the lawyer intentionally or 
recklessly disregarded a legal obligation.365 This ex post evaluative 
criterion does not alter the quantum of proof needed to establish a 
violation, but by changing the mens rea standard from negligence to at 
least recklessness, it makes it less likely that a lawyer will be subject to 
discipline for a close call. Allowing evidence of compliance with ex ante 
norms, such as professional custom, is also a way of avoiding hindsight 
bias.366 Disciplinary proceedings are likely to involve expert testimony on 
professional custom, and experts have their own reputational incentives 
and ethical standards to provide a check on biased judgment.367 These 
checks ensure that scholars and other experts who disagree with the 
policy goals of a lawyer’s client will nevertheless be able to conclude that 
the lawyer’s advice complied with applicable ethical standards. 
The Article up to this point has offered both a constructive doctrinal 
(Part II) and a theoretical (Part III) account of the duties of government 
lawyers. The question remains whether this conception of ethical 
lawyering provides a useful critical standpoint both prospectively and 
retrospectively¾such that, to guide lawyers in their conduct and to serve 
as a framework for evaluation of misconduct by courts and disciplinary 
agencies. The following Part considers an episode from the early weeks 
of the Trump administration that posed a challenge for lawyers within 
the government. 
 
 362. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 571 (1998). 
 363. Id. at 573. 
 364. See id. at 606–07 (arguing that raising the standard of proof from preponderance of evidence 
to clear and convincing would likely undo the effect of hindsight bias). 
 365. See OPR ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 191. 
 366. Rachlinski, supra note 362, at 612–13. 
 367. See, e.g., Carl M. Selinger, The Problematical Role of the Legal Ethics Expert Witness, 13 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 405 (2000); Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 465 (1999). 
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IV.  CASE STUDY¾TRUMP’S MUSLIM BAN ORDER 
During the campaign, Trump promised on numerous occasions to 
enact at least a temporary pause, if not a permanent ban, on entry into 
the United States either of Muslims or people from regions with a known 
history of supporting terrorism.368 After the election, Trump continued 
to maintain his support for the ban or a registry of Muslims already living 
in the United States After an attack on a Christmas market in Berlin that 
killed twelve people, Trump was asked if he still supported his proposed 
ban or registry, and he replied, “[y]ou know my plans . . . . All along, I’ve 
been proven to be right, 100 percent correct.”369 Early in the campaign 
Trump also alluded to establishing a database or registry to track 
Muslims in the United States.370 Trump advisor Rudy Giuliani stated in 
an interview that Trump had asked him how to implement a Muslim ban 
lawfully.371 
In his first week in office, President Trump issued an executive order 
immediately blocking the entry into the United States of all refugees and 
all citizens of seven majority-Muslim countries, even those with lawful 
permanent residence in the United States.372 The ban on Syrian refugees 
 
 368. See, e.g., Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump is Expanding His Muslim Ban, Not Rolling It Back, 
WASH. POST (July 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/ 
07/24/donald-trump-is-expanding-his-muslim-ban-not-rolling-it-back (quoting Trump saying, in 
his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, that the country “must immediately 
suspend immigration from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism until such time it’s 
proven that vetting mechanisms have been put in place”); Jenna Johnson, No, Donald Trump Has 
Not Softened His Stance on Banning Muslims, WASH. POST (May 12, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/no-donald-trump-has-not-softened-his-stance-on-
banning-muslims/2016/05/12. Trump’s first statement on the issue was a call for a “total and 
complete” ban on Muslims entering the United States. See Jenna Johnson & David Weigel, Donald 
Trump Calls for ‘Total’ Ban on Muslims Entering United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2015/12/07. 
 369. See Madeline Conway, Trump Stokes Fears He’ll Pursue Muslim Ban, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/trump-muslim-ban-kellyanne-conway-232912; see also Abby Phillip 
& Abigail Hauslohner, Trump on the Future of Proposed Muslim Ban, Registry: ‘You Know My Plans,’ WASH. 
POST (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/12/21/trump-on-the-
future-of-proposed-muslim-ban-registry-you-know-my-plans. 
 370. See Vaughn Hillyard, Donald Trump’s Plan for a Muslim Database Draws Comparison to 
Nazi Germany, NBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016 
-election/trump-says-he-would-certainly-implement-muslim-database-n466716. 
 371. See Rebecca Savransky, Giuliani: Trump Asked Me How to Do a Muslim Ban ‘Legally,’ THE 
HILL (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:48 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316726-giuliani 
-trump-asked-me-how-to-do-a-muslim-ban-legally. 
 372. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order on Refugees Amid Chaos and 
Outcry Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/ 
refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps-immigration-order.html. 
Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly subsequently issued a statement deeming the entry of lawful 
permanent residents¾such as, green card holders¾to be in the national interest and thus permitted 
notwithstanding the executive order. See Statement by Secretary John Kelly on the Entry of Lawful 
Permanent Residents into the United States (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/ 
01/29/statement-secretary-john-kelly-entry-lawful-permanent-residents-united-states. 
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was permanent, while the entry ban on other nationals was intended to 
be temporary, supposedly to provide time for the government to review 
its procedures for granting visas. For the purposes of analyzing the 
ethical obligations of government lawyers, however, we can turn this 
news story into a hypothetical. The order was drafted during the 
transition period by advisors to Trump, presumably including Rudy 
Giuliani and White House strategist Steven Bannon.373 Assume for the 
sake of discussion that, during the transition, the task of legal analysis of 
the proposed executive order was shared between a lawyer advising the 
presidential transition team and a career attorney in the Homeland 
Security Department’s Office of General Counsel, Regulatory Affairs Law 
Division.374 
This attorney realized the President has broad statutory 
authorization to suspend “the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens 
into the United States,” if the President determines that entry “would be 
detrimental to the interests of the United States.”375 However, the 
attorney is concerned about the possibility of challenges to the executive 
order on the ground of discriminatory enforcement, given Trump’s 
campaign statements.376 The Supreme Court has generally followed a 
deferential approach with respect to the Executive when noncitizens have 
alleged discriminatory enforcement of immigration laws. In a case 
involving a Marxist academic who was barred from entering the United 
States to deliver lectures at universities, the Supreme Court said that it 
would not look behind a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for 
denying entry into the United States.377 The Court reaffirmed the “facially 
legitimate and bona fide” standard quite recently, in Kerry v. Din.378 
 
 373. See Shear supra note 373 (“A senior administration official said that the order was drafted in 
cooperation with some immigration experts on Capitol Hill and members of the ‘beachhead 
teams’¾small groups of political appointees sent by the new White House to be liaisons and begin 
work at the agencies.”). 
 374. See Office of the General Counsel, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/office-general-counsel (“[T]he General Counsel is ultimately responsible for all 
of the Department’s legal determinations . . . . The Office of the General Counsel’s central tasks 
include . . . providing complete, accurate, and timely legal advice on possible courses of action for the 
Department.”). 
 375. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2006). 
 376. While this evidence cannot be taken into account in the hypothetical, considering the 
constitutionality of the order from an ex ante point of view, it is noteworthy that in the actual case, 
Trump promised that once the new “extreme vetting” procedures were in place, his administration 
would give priority for admission to Christians. See Carol Morello, Trump Signs Order Temporarily 
Halting Admission of Refugees, Promises Priority for Christians, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-approves-extreme-vetting-of-
refugees-promises-priority-for-christians/2017/01/27/007021a2-e4c7-11e6-a547-
5fb9411d332c_story.html. 
 377. Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
 378. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which is the controlling opinion in that 
case, stated that: 
Once this standard [from Kleindienst] is met, courts will neither look 
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its 
justification against the constitutional interests of citizens the visa 
denial might implicate. This reasoning has particular force in the area 
of national security, for which Congress has provided specific statutory 
directions pertaining to visa applications by noncitizens who seek entry 
to this country.379 
The Kleindienst test works in conjunction with the general principle 
that courts should not engage in “judicial psychoanalysis” to determine 
the “real” motivations behind a government official’s actions.380 In the 
context of a selective prosecution claim brought by members of a 
politically unpopular group, the Court demonstrated reluctance to delve 
into the motivation of officials who sought to deport the petitioners: 
The Executive should not have to disclose its “real” reasons for deeming 
nationals of a particular country a special threat—or indeed for simply 
wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that 
country’s nationals—and even if it did disclose them a court would be 
ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess 
their adequacy.381 
Here, the DHS attorney was nevertheless concerned, because the 
draft executive order appeared to be both under-inclusive and  
over-inclusive, relative to the goal of preventing the entry into the United 
States of potential jihadi terrorists. On the one hand, it keeps out refugees 
who are fleeing violence in their home country and, in the case of Syrian 
refugees, ends the existing application process which included an 
extensive background investigation. On the other, it makes no effort to 
increase scrutiny of entrants from countries presenting a real and present 
terrorist threat. The attorney therefore worries that, notwithstanding the 
broad executive authority to regulate immigration, and despite the usual 
deference exhibited by courts in immigration matters, the draft order 
may be unconstitutional as an instance of prohibited religious 
discrimination. Although facially neutral as between Muslim and non-
Muslim citizens of the seven covered nations, a court may conclude, 
based on Trump’s expressions of support for a Muslim ban, and 
Giuliani’s statement that he was asked for assistance in designing a 
Muslim ban, that the order was “motivated by discriminatory animus and 
its application results in a discriminatory effect.”382 Under the Arlington 
 
 379. Id. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 380. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). 
 381. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). 
 382. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). I am 
grateful to Steve Shiffrin for conversations about the background constitutional standards applicable 
to the order. 
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Heights factors, to determine whether a government action is motivated 
by discriminatory animus, a court would consider the impact of the 
official action, whether there has been a clear pattern unexplainable on 
grounds besides discrimination, the historical background of the 
decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged 
decision, and departures from the normal procedural sequence.383 
What should the attorney do? The first thing to notice is the subtle 
differences in framing between these two questions: 
Might a court enjoin enforcement of the President’s draft executive 
order on the ground of discriminatory purpose? 
Is the President’s draft executive order unconstitutional as a product of 
prohibited discriminatory purpose? 
The first question implicitly adopts a litigator’s mindset. The 
question is not whether the proposed order is constitutional, but whether 
a court is likely to find it is constitutional. Competent lawyers should 
advise their clients of the likelihood that a court will prohibit an action, 
but it is important not to conflate the second question¾is the order 
lawful¾with a prediction of what a court might decide if presented with 
the question. Law is not a prediction of what officials might do. This is 
the famous, or notorious, Holmesian bad man interpretive attitude, 
building on Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dictum that “[i]f you want to know 
the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only 
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to 
predict.”384 The law-as-prediction theory has been demolished 
repeatedly by philosophers more careful than Holmes did while 
delivering a lecture to law students. As H. L. A. Hart showed, the 
Holmesian bad man point of view is blind to the role of the law in 
providing guidance for a citizen¾Hart calls him the “puzzled man”¾who 
wishes to know what legal rights and duties he actually has.385 The 
Holmesian bad man perspective cannot incorporate the distinctive 
feature of any rules, whether legal, social, or the rules of a sport like 
cricket, which is that they provide guidance for officials imposing 
sanctions as well as for those subject to the rules.386 The function of law 
is to guide action, and the function of rules is to provide a justification for 
acting, refraining from acting, or punishing others. Doing something out 
of the fear of being punished is not the same as doing something because 
it is one’s duty or obligation to do so. Holmes usefully reminded students 
not to confuse moral and legal obligations, but it is a gross misreading of 
 
 383. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 606 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–67). 
 384. Holmes, supra note 10, at 459. 
 385. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40 (2d ed. 1994). 
 386. Id. at 41, 82–86. 
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his lecture to conclude that the law, by its nature, is reducible to 
predictions concerning the imposition of sanctions.387 
The attorney’s question is therefore the second one: Is the 
President’s proposed order unconstitutional, quite apart from what a 
court may decide. Of course, all lawyers engage in prediction as a 
heuristic. Ever since law school we have been accustomed to thinking in 
litigators’ terms, about what a court would do in response to the 
plaintiff’s or defendant’s argument. An attorney’s judgment concerning 
the plausibility of a legal position may find its natural expression as a 
prediction of how the argument would fare if presented to a court. Legal 
judgments are seldom binary. Lawyers express conclusions in 
probabilistic terms. But this is a heuristic only, and the attorney is 
advising the President on what the law actually permits or requires, with 
an additional term expressing the attorney’s confidence in the judgment. 
The attorney may conclude, for example, that the order is likely 
constitutional, in view of the traditional deference by courts to the 
Executive with respect to immigration matters, but that there is some 
likelihood that a reviewing court may find, on the Arlington Heights 
factors, that the order was motivated by invidious discrimination. Judges 
of course vary, and will differ in their receptiveness to claims of 
discrimination, in their willingness to assume good faith on the part of 
government actors, in the attitude they take toward multifactor tests like 
Arlington Heights, and in general human qualities such as optimism 
versus cynicism about the motivations of others. To some extent, luck is 
an ineliminable element of positive law,388 and therefore even the most 
experienced lawyer cannot eliminate the qualification at the end of her 
advice. “This is probably okay but there’s always a chance” is the kind of 
lawyerly double-talk that can be irritating to clients, but it does express 
the hard-won knowledge that few things are certain when it comes to the 
application of law. Still, there is a difference between predicting a result 
and reaching a judgment about the content of applicable law, even if the 
latter is hedged with a warning about what a court might do. 
An attorney may be making a judgment, but it does not follow that 
the attorney must adopt the interpretive attitude of a “neutral expositor” 
or provide her best view of the law.389 As argued above, an attorney 
advising a government agency, or the Executive Branch of government, 
may exercise creativity to find a lawful way for the agency or the President 
to accomplish its objectives. A little bit of partisanship is all right, as long 
as the lawyer retains the ability to judge when a position has insufficient 
legal support to represent a good faith conclusion of law, as opposed to 
 
 387. See DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 68–71 (1984). 
 388. See Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 185 (2007). 
 389. Compare Moss, supra note 17, with Johnsen, supra note 11. 
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merely something that can be asserted in litigation without fear of 
sanctions. A legal advisor operates “between the roles of politically 
neutral judge and avowedly partisan advocate.”390 
What if the attorney disagrees in moral terms with the proposed 
executive order? Ironically, given the term “legal ethics,” scholars debate 
the extent to which lawyers may account for ethical considerations that 
are not embodied in positive law. My view is that the attorney’s obligation 
is to advise the President on the legality of the proposed executive order 
and to take care not to allow her judgments concerning its legality to be 
influenced by political or ethical disagreement with its objectives. True, 
Rule 2.1 permits the attorney to “refer not only to law but to . . . moral, 
economic, social, and political factors” that may bear on the client’s 
decision.391 The attorney may give this advice, but should not be 
surprised when it is ignored. The President has other advisors to consider 
social and political factors, and the President is a moral agent who is 
responsible for the decisions he makes. If the order turns out to be a 
catastrophe, blame properly belongs to the President. This is not a 
feature only of the role of government legal advisor; in any  
attorney-client relationship there is a moral division of labor between the 
client, who establishes the objectives of the representation, and the 
lawyer who provides technical assistance and is responsible for the 
means by which the representation is carried out.392 If the attorney’s 
moral disagreement with the President’s objectives can be characterized 
as fundamental, the attorney may resign.393 If there is a delegation of 
authority to an attorney to exercise discretion, moral considerations may 
come into play. For example, the Attorney General may make 
discretionary decisions concerning enforcement priorities. However, the 
Attorney General is also subject to the direction of the President, and if 
the President insists on pursuing some objective, the Attorney General 
should determine whether that objective is lawful, and if so, provide 
assistance to the President in carrying it out. 
In the actual events upon which this case study is based, Acting 
Attorney General Sally Yates (a hold-over from the Obama 
Administration) wrote a letter to Justice Department officials stating her 
refusal to enforce the President’s executive order.394 She stated that the 
Office of Legal Counsel had reviewed the order for form and legality, but 
that OLC did not consider “whether any policy choice embodied in an 
Executive Order is wise or just.” She stated that her responsibility was to 
 
 390. Morrison, supra note 11, at 1715. 
 391. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
 392. Id. at r. 1.2(a). 
 393. Id. at r. 1.16(b)(4). 
 394. See Letter from Sally Yates, Acting Attorney General, https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/3438879/Letter-From-Sally-Yates.pdf. 
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“ensure that the position of the Department of Justice is not only legally 
defensible, but is informed by our best view of what the law is after 
consideration of all the facts” and complies with the Attorney General’s 
“solemn obligation to always seek justice and stand for what is right.”395 
The President fired her immediately.396 Leaving aside the political 
repercussions for Trump of escalating a crisis in the early weeks of a new 
administration and evoking Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre in the 
process, in my judgment Acting Attorney General Yates got two 
important features of the role of government legal advisor wrong. 
First, the Justice Department does have an obligation to seek justice 
and stand for what is right, but the content of those values is not self-
evident. One may believe, for example, that American values require 
opening the door to refugees from war-ravaged countries, where 
Muslims are disproportionately victimized by terrorism. But others 
disagree and, importantly, this disagreement is often reasonable. One of 
the inescapable conditions of modern society is a plurality of reasonable 
moral and religious beliefs, as well as uncertainty about the facts bearing 
on moral decision-making. What Rawls calls the burdens of judgment lay 
heavy on political officials who act in the name of the community and in 
pursuit of its common good.397 There are plenty of members of our 
political community who believe the United States has been too 
permissive in its refugee policy, who point to recent terror attacks in 
France and Germany as evidence that liberals are blind to the danger of 
infiltration by radicalized jihadis, and that the first obligation of anyone 
entrusted with the community’s safety is to secure the nation’s borders. 
Unelected government officials and their legal advisors should not act 
directly on their conception of the public interest; that is exactly what is 
contested in, and resolved by, elections.398 Acting Attorney General Yates 
has her views on what is in the public interest; President Trump and his 
political advisor Steven Bannon have another. In the moral division of 
labor that characterizes the service conception of attorney-client 
relationship, it is for elected political officials to make the judgment call 
concerning issues of justice and what is right. If Yates’s letter stated that 
she refused to enforce the order because it was unlawful because it was 
motived by invidious discrimination,399 her stance would have been 
 
 395. Id. 
 396. See Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-immigration-ban-
memo.html?mcubz=3. 
 397. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54–58 (1993). 
 398. See Miller, supra note 15, at 1294–95. 
 399. It was reported that Yates’s concerns were in fact premised on the statements by Trump and 
Giuliani that suggested the order was a Muslim ban with a veneer of neutrality. See Alan Blinder & 
Matt Apuzzo, Trump’s Talk About Muslims Led Acting Attorney General to Defy Ban, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/sally-yates-trump-immigration-
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ethically proper, and her firing by Trump would have more closely 
resembled the firing of Archibald Cox in the Saturday Night Massacre. 
But she chose in her letter to attack the order as unjust, not to question 
its legality. This is not semantic nor a mere difference in emphasis in 
drafting; it misstates the central professional obligation of a government 
legal advisor. 
Second, a government attorney, even acting in a non-litigation 
capacity, does not have an obligation to seek the best view of the law 
unless her client asks for this advice. Instead, the attorney’s ethical 
responsibility is to ensure that a proposed course of action is legally 
permissible. There may be a gap between something that is permitted 
and the best view of the law. In this case the executive order may even be 
approaching the line of unlawfulness. President Trump cannot un-ring 
the bell of Islamophobia he so vigorously sounded during the campaign, 
and statements by advisors like Rudy Giuliani and Michael Flynn have 
heightened suspicion that the facially neutral executive order is 
motivated by discriminatory animus. If Yates believed the history of the 
executive order would render it unlawful, she should have given that 
advice. It appeared from her letter, however, that she believed the order 
to be lawful¾perhaps only barely so¾but inconsistent with her best view 
(or the Department’s best view) of the law. The word “best” is ambiguous 
here. Is Yates invoking something like the interpretation that is most 
likely to be sustained if challenged in court? That seems unlikely since 
her letter is focused on the Department’s purported obligation to do what 
is right and just. That suggests she intends “best” to refer to something 
like a Dworkinian constructive interpretation, which shows the 
community’s law in its best light as determined by considerations of 
political morality.400 But Dworkinian interpretation relies on an 
implausible degree of consensus regarding what is “best” by the 
standards of political morality. Dworkin does acknowledge that a judge 
may face a choice between two competing interpretations of law, both of 
which pass the threshold test of fit, and in the end must simply decide 
that one vision of the community’s political morality is more powerful 
than the other.401 As a theory of adjudication, that makes a certain 
amount of sense; after all, what else is a judge to do? However, it is less 
satisfying in the realm of legal ethics. In adjudication, there is nothing 
comparable to the moral division of labor in the attorney-client 
relationship. As a matter of agency law and the rules of professional 
conduct, where there are two competing visions of the public good 
 
ban.html?mcubz=3. 
 400. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 263 (1986) (arguing that a judge ought to choose an 
interpretation that the judge believes “best from the standpoint of political morality” and should seek 
“the best common principles politics can find.”). 
 401. Id. at 268–71. 
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available to a lawyer, the responsibility for selecting between them is the 
client’s. If the proposed course of action is lawful, the lawyer’s duty as an 
advisor is complete, and the client may go ahead and execute on the 
planned action. 
Much of this Article has been organized around the theme of legal 
determinacy and the rule of law. The most important obligation of an 
attorney acting as a legal advisor, to a government or private client 
equally, is to provide competent, independent advice on the legality of 
the client’s actions. As is so frequently the case, there is not a clear answer 
to the question, “is the executive order unconstitutional?” But this should 
not be taken to entail that a legal advisor should not raise concerns about 
its legality, because the law is indeterminate. A conception of ethical 
lawyering that is properly informed by the value of the rule of law 
requires the legal advisor to consider legal reasons for and against the 
client’s intended action. As discussed in Part III, legal reasons can be 
distinguished from policy, moral, or political reasons by properties such 
as their generality, rational intelligibility, and foundation in past political 
acts of the community in relevantly similar situations. A process-based 
approach to the rule of law emphasizes the continuity of a reasoning 
process that manifests respect for all citizens affected by government 
action, including those whose views were ultimately subordinated to 
others. In the case of the executive order, a lawyer should consider both 
the traditional deference of courts to the Executive in matters pertaining 
to immigration and border security, as well as the constitutional principle 
that disfavored groups should not be singled out for harsh treatment on 
the basis of religion or nationality. Reasonable lawyers may disagree on 
the weight and priority of these considerations, but to the extent humanly 
possible¾and of course it is difficult to set aside one’s strongly held 
commitments¾the balancing process ought to be responsive to the 
relative importance of these values throughout the law generally, and 
specifically with respect to immigration matters. In my judgment, the 
post 9/11 history of restrictions on immigration shows that the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause does not prohibit the 
President from implementing the proposed order. In my judgment, a 
government legal advisor may seek to dissuade the President, for moral 
or political reasons, but on the question of legality, would be ethically 
required to approve the order. But it is a close call, and a reasonable 
lawyer may conclude otherwise. As long as she is prepared to give legal 
reasons for that conclusion, her conduct should also be regarded as in 
compliance with the ethical obligations of legal advisors. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time of writing this Article, in the weeks before and the 
months following Inauguration Day 2017, we obviously know very little 
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about the conduct of most lawyers within the Trump Administration. It 
is entirely possible that no Executive Branch lawyer will have engaged in 
conduct that runs contrary to the value of the rule of law. Even if 
government lawyers do engage in misconduct, it may be a while before it 
is detected, investigated, and made public. Perhaps it will never become 
known. This Article is therefore offered in an optimistic spirit, for 
government lawyers who are looking for guidance on the law of lawyering 
in all its complexity and subtlety. The law of lawyering embodies a 
substantive ethical conception of professionalism as ensuring respect for 
the rule of law. But there is also a monitory subtext, reminding lawyers 
that they are subject to regulation and discipline by state courts for 
assisting government actors in unlawful conduct. If such a disciplinary 
proceeding is commenced, the predictable response from supporters of 
the Administration will be that professional discipline is being 
weaponized in a partisan political conflict. The detailed doctrinal 
engagement with the law of lawyering is intended to fortify regulators 
who appropriately seek to hold all lawyers, including those working for 
the federal government, to professional ethical standards. These norms 
are not political in the Red State vs. Blue State sense, but represent the 
profession’s own effort to conform the conduct of lawyers to the ideal of 
legality. The post-Watergate experience with lawyer regulation, 
including the battles over the Bush Administration’s aggressive 
assertions of power, has established legal precedent and interpretive 
practices that do stand apart from political ideology. 
This Administration may do many things with which I disagree as a 
policy matter, and that is its prerogative. We live in a democracy, and 
have to live with the results of elections. But the boundaries on what the 
Administration may lawfully do are enforced by government legal 
advisors, who have duties both of loyal service to their client and also 
expressing fidelity to law. The legal profession has traditionally seen itself 
as playing a stabilizing role in society. Tocqueville famously referred to 
the legal profession as an American aristocracy¾“the strongest barriers 
against the faults of democracy.”402 Tocqueville’s observation has 
become a self-congratulatory cliché for American lawyers, but if the 2016 
presidential campaign and the early months of the Trump presidency are 
any indication, it will not be long before government lawyers are forced 
to choose between acquiescing in the exercise of raw power and fulfilling 
the core ethical obligation of refusing to assist a client in unlawful 
conduct. 
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